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  absTraCT
While some developing countries appear to have been largely unaffected by the 
Great Recession that originated in advanced economies, others took a severe blow in 2008-2009. 
A number of recent studies have attempted to explain the observed heterogeneity of developing 
country growth performances during the latest global financial and economic crisis by linking 
it to pre-crisis macro-economic and financial country features - with rather mixed success. In 
this newly emerging body of research, surprisingly little attention has, however, been paid to 
institutional differences between countries, and the variation in political institutional arrange-
ments more particularly. The current paper takes a first shot at bridging this hiatus by gauging 
the impact of democracy on the crisis growth of developing countries. From a theoretical point 
of view, and as suggested in the political economy literature, democracy could be either growth-
retarding or growth-enhancing in times of economic crisis, the overall effect ultimately being an 
empirical question. Using a cross-section sample of more than 100 non-advanced countries and 
controlling for a range of macroeconomic, financial and standard institutional factors as well as 
pre-crisis trends, we find evidence suggesting that, on the whole, democratic country features 
are negatively correlated with growth performance during the 2008-2009 global crisis. Our find-
ings are seemingly robust to the use of various sets of controls, different estimators, several 
country subsamples and alternative measures of democracy and crisis growth.
Keywords:   global financial crisis; growth; external shocks; democracy
JEL codes:   F30; O11; O43; P596 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
1.  InTroduCTIon
‘[T]he lesson [from the global crisis] for ruling elites in many low-income countries is likely to be that 
executive discretion should not be too easily forsaken in the name of Western-style democratic ac-
countability. What is likely to dominate as an idea in the developing world following the crisis is that 
China was succeeding before the crisis and succeeded in managing the pressures of the crisis very 
well indeed. Whether the right lesson or not, that will be associated with its ability to get things done 
without the perceived complications of more accountable political systems.’ (Birdsall, 2011:14)
Financial sector problems in several advanced economies, triggered by the burst-
ing of the US housing bubble and subsequent increases in subprime mortgage default rates in 
the summer of 2007, eventually transformed into a full-fledged global economic crisis late 2008. 
While outside the crisis epicentre, developing countries (both emerging and non-emerging) 
shared in the burden, being affected by a wave of external financial and real shocks, most nota-
bly a global flight-to-safety of capital and faltering world trade (see e.g. IMF, 2009; ODI, 2010). 
In its latest World Economic Outlook Report the IMF estimates overall 2009 real GDP growth in 
the developing world at around 2.8 percent, down from 6.0 a year earlier and 8.9 in 2007 (IMF, 
2011).1 Importantly, these aggregate growth figures mask large variation across developing coun-
tries. Whereas China kept growing at more than 9 percent in 2009 (again in real terms), Latvia’s 
economy shrunk by almost 18 percent in the same year. For low-income Zambia and Cambodia, 
growth rates of more than 6 and nearly -2 percent, respectively, were recorded in 2009.
A number of recent papers have attempted to explain the observed heterogeneity 
of developing country growth performances during the latest global crisis by linking it to pre-
crisis macro-economic and financial conditions - with rather mixed success, as will be shown. 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, these studies have largely overlooked the potential role played 
by various types of institutions; this in spite of a copious literature that emphasises that these 
‘rules of the game’ matter for growth.2 In fact, none of the mentioned studies have considered 
the potential importance of political institutional arrangements for crisis severity.
In the current paper we take a shot at bridging this hiatus by gauging the impact 
of democracy, or its defining characteristics, on the growth of developing countries during the 
2008-2009 crisis. To our best knowledge the paper represents the first attempt to do so in an 
earnest manner.
As the above quote from Center for Global Development President Nancy Birdsall 
points out, China’s recent accomplishments could be expected to serve as an example of how 
autocracies, next to achieving impressive growth in booming times, may also have advantages 
over more accountable regimes in withstanding the negative impact of global shocks on econo-
mic performance. We think it is an interesting undertaking to see whether such inductive reaso-
ning finds any resonance in cross-country data on the latest crisis and survives in a multivariate 
setting; to be sure, even if China benefitted from its autocratic governance during the crisis, one 
cannot simply extend that logic to other developing economies without taking into account va-
rious other country-specific features. 
Previewing our conclusions, for a sample of more than 100 non-advanced countries, 
[1]   The corresponding growth figures for the group of advanced (i.e. ‘developed’) countries are 2.8 percent in 2007, 
0.1 in 2008, and -3.7 in 2009 (IMF, 2011). 
[2]   See North (1990), Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001; 2005) 
and Rodrik et al. (2004), among numerous others. For alternative, somewhat deviant perspectives on institutions and 
growth, see e.g. Glaeser et al. (2004) and Chang (2006).7 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
this paper finds econometric evidence suggesting that, indeed, democracy is negatively correla-
ted with growth performance during the 2008-2009 global crisis. These findings are seemingly 
robust to the use of various sets of control variables, different estimators, several country sub-
samples and alternative measures of democracy and crisis growth.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 first reviews the recent body of 
studies that have sought to explain cross-country differences in GDP growth during the global 
crisis. Section 3 is devoted to the relevant theoretical and empirical political economy literature 
on the links between democracy on the one hand, and growth, volatility and crisis on the other. 
Our methodological approach and the data used are introduced in Section 4. Section 5 presents 
baseline results, subjects them to a series of robustness tests and considers possible interaction 
effects. Section 6 concludes and highlights some of the remaining caveats, as well as further 
avenues of research. 8 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
2.  explaInIng developIng CounTry growTh In The greaT      
  reCessIon
  The great disparities among countries in growth performances during the global 
financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009 has initiated a growing body of research attempting 
to link initial, pre-crisis conditions to such cross-country variation in crisis growth trajectories.3 
As will be made clear below, these empirical studies vary substantially in terms of country sam-
ples, methodological set-up, explanatory variables included, crisis measures and their time-
frame. 
Most of this research (that has considered non-advanced countries) has focused on 
a smaller group of ‘emerging market’ economies only.4 An early exploratory exercise by Berkmen 
et al. (2009) finds, for a core sample of 40 emerging markets, that higher domestic leverage, 
faster cumulative credit growth and fixed exchange rates prior to the onset of the crisis are all 
related to downward revisions in growth forecasts after the Lehman collapse. Blanchard et al. 
(2010) identify trade and financial exposure variables and trading partner country growth as 
having much explanatory power for cross-country differences in unexpected growth, i.e. actual 
GDP growth rates minus earlier IMF forecasts, during the height of the crisis (between 2008Q4 
and 2009Q1). Because of data limitations, however, their sample is limited to 29 emerging 
markets. Including advanced countries in the analysis, Claessens et al. (2010) present evidence 
suggesting that the larger the house price appreciation, credit growth and the current account 
deficit in an economy, the greater the duration, severity and adversity of the crisis - defined as the 
number of consecutive quarters of negative growth, the cumulative decline in GDP from start 
to end of the recession, and the decline in average growth between 2003-2007 and 2008-2009, 
respectively. Llaudes et al. (2010) take a somewhat different approach; they use country-specific 
peak-to-through percent changes in quarterly GDP as their preferred measure of crisis impact. 
For a sample of 57 emerging markets it is shown that higher external sector vulnerability, as 
proxied by a subindex of the IMF’s (unpublished) VEE5, is positively correlated with their crisis 
impact indicator. In contrast with the foregoing studies, Llaudes et al. also find a dampening 
effect of countries’ pre-crisis reserve holdings on output declines during the crisis, although the 
protection offered through reserves seems subject to diminishing returns. Frankel and Saravelos 
(2010) browse the extensive ‘early warning indicators’ literature and conclude that the two 
leading indicators extracted from this literature, i.e. international reserves and real exchange 
rate overvaluation, again stand out as most useful in explaining 2008-2009 crisis incidence. 
Tsangarides (2010), which looks at the role of exchange rate regimes into more detail, finds that 
emerging markets with pegged regimes fared no worse than those with floats during the crisis, 
although the former appear to have recovered more slowly than the latter in subsequent years. 
Finally, in a rare attempt to consider institutional factors, Giannone et al. (2011) use Bayesian 
model averaging to establish a negative link between market-friendly credit regulation and 
crisis growth in 102 advanced and (mostly middle-income) developing countries. They suggest 
that the detrimental impact of credit market liberalisation may capture unobserved risk-taking 
[3]   Other, related empirical research on developing countries inspired by the crisis includes studies that consider 
linkages and crisis contagion between countries (e.g. Rose and Spiegel, 2009a; Drummond and Ramirez, 2009), ex-
amine business cycle synchronisation for country pairs (e.g. Imbs, 2010), or place countries’ crisis experiences in his-
torical perspective (e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2011).
[4]   This is, of course, understandable, as these countries are typically more integrated in the world economy (and 
hence more exposed to a global crisis) than other, ‘non-emerging’ developing economies. Also, much more (and argu-
ably more reliable) data is available for the former.
[5]  The acronym VEE stands for ‘Vulnerability Exercises for Emerging Markets’.9 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
behaviour, especially that associated with foreign and privately-owned banks in an economy.
Other cross-country research including emerging markets exhibits a much more 
conservative stance. Most notably, Rose and Spiegel (2009b) contend that, out of more than 60 
candidate crisis correlates, not one presents itself as a robust predictor of crisis incidence in 107 
countries, with the possible exception of pre-crisis equity market appreciation. These sobering 
results may, however, hinge on the authors’ particular choice of trying to explain output growth 
jointly with other indicators6 and their use of pre-March 2009 data estimates only. An extensive 
update of the analysis by the same authors largely corroborates the original findings; Rose 
and Spiegel (2010) show that almost none of the variables found to be statistically significant 
crisis predictors by other researchers survive simultaneous inclusion in regressions or sample 
changes. 
Only a few recent studies on crisis growth differences have widened their scope to 
include non-emerging developing countries. Employing larger samples of up to 162 economies, 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011) trace back lower output and domestic demand growth during the 
crisis to pre-crisis factors such as rapid private sector credit growth, current account deficits, 
trade openness, the manufacturing share of output and, to a lesser extent, pegged exchange 
rate regimes. In a similar fashion, Didier et al. (2011) demonstrate that advanced and developing 
countries more open to trade, with larger current account deficits and higher pre-crisis domestic 
credit growth experienced more severe growth collapses between 2007 and 2009. The strongest 
post-crisis growth recovery, on the other hand, is recorded in countries that suffered larger 2007-
2009 growth collapses and held more international reserves prior to the crisis. Lastly, Berg et al. 
(2011) focus on growth collapses in a core sample of 49 non-fuel exporting low-income countries 
in particular; they find such collapses to be correlated with changes in external demand growth, 
i.e. the export-weighted average output growth in export partner countries, and private sector 
credit growth in the boom years. According to Berg et al., cross-country differences in the pre-
crisis structural environment of low-income economies, apart from those in reserve coverage 
and labour market flexibility perhaps, explain little of total variation in crisis growth.
Our paper is most closely related to the three latter studies in terms of methodology, 
sample, crisis measures and control variables (see section 4.1 for details). Importantly, however, 
we complement the existing empirical cross-country research on the crisis by bringing political 
institutions, one potentially valuable dimension overlooked by existing studies, more explicitly 
into the analysis. In particular, the paper examines whether democracy, or typical features 
thereof, can explain part of developing country variation in economic growth declines during the 
2008-2009 crisis period.
So, what should one a priori expect? Given a series of macroeconomic, financial 
and other institutional country factors, are democratic countries more likely to be successful 
in preventing growth from faltering during a global economic crisis than their autocratic 
counterparts? It seems that the existing political economy literature, both in its theoretical and 
empirical guises, is far from conclusive on this. Nevertheless, generally speaking (and perhaps 
unsurprisingly so), democracies seem to be given somewhat more credit than autocracies. In 
the following section, we review selected political economy studies, we think, are most relevant 
here, before moving to a description of our empirical model (section 4).
[6]   To this end, Rose and Spiegel (2009b) construct what they denote as a non-structural Multiple Indicator 
Multiple Cause (MIMIC) model of the crisis.10 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
3.  demoCraCy, growTh, volaTIlITy and CrIsIs
The enquiry on whether and how political constraints, embodied by different 
regime types and other, more specific political institutions, influence policy choice and ultimately 
determine economic outcomes, constitutes the heart of much of the (new) political economy 
research agenda (see Drazen, 2000:3-19). In this section we highlight three subareas of interest 
for the purpose of our paper.7 First, by means of introduction, the contentious relation between 
democracy and economic growth is shortly explained. Second, we devote some attention to the 
links between democracy and growth volatility (or its inverse, economic stability). Emphasis will 
be on the third political economy subfield we consider, i.e. democracy and crisis (management), 
as it is logically closest to the paper’s research question.
3.1.  Democracy and growth
The existence and precise nature of a democracy-growth nexus has been the 
subject of a vast theoretical and empirical literature whose results are, on the whole, remarkably 
inconclusive.8 An oft-cited survey by Przeworski and Limongi (1993) summarises the classic 
arguments that relate political regime types to long-term growth as follows: first, the idea 
that democracies are more successful in protecting property rights, which in turn are necessary 
to  foster  growth;  second,  the  view  that  democracies  give  rise  to  pressures  for  immediate 
consumption, thereby deterring investment and, ultimately, growth; and third, the view that 
authoritarian regimes are predatory, have no interest in acting according to general interest 
and hence allocate resources inefficiently. Przeworski and Limongi show that each of these 
arguments contains loopholes and conclude that, while politics may indeed matter for growth, 
thinking in terms of ‘regimes’ does not fully capture the relevant political diversity.9 
Another issue which complicates interpreting a positive correlation between 
democracy and long-term growth (if any) as causal is the possibility that some level of economic 
development may also be a necessary condition for democracy to sprout (and persist). This is 
in fact one of the central tenets of much of the post-war modernisation literature that followed 
Lipset’s (1959) seminal work on the requisites for democracy (for an overview of that literature, 
see Leftwich, 1996).10 
[7]  Rather than being exhaustive in our treatise of each of these three subareas, we aim at presenting some theo-
retical and empirical substance that could inform our ex ante expectations about the relation between democracy and 
growth performance during the latest global crisis.
[8]  A recent meta-analysis of the democracy-growth literature by Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008), however, 
challenges this ‘consensus of an inconclusive relationship’. After reviewing 84 previous studies and subjecting them 
to various meta-level evaluation techniques, the authors claim that, whereas democracy has a zero direct effect on 
economic growth, there are a number of indirect channels (including human capital accumulation, lower political in-
stability and economic freedom) through which democracy positively and significantly impacts on growth (and other 
channels that exert a negative influence). It is concluded that, at the minimum, the net effect of democracy on the 
economy is not detrimental to growth.
[9]  Such observations have motivated researchers to move beyond the simple democracy-autocracy divide and 
explore the impact on (long-term) growth and other outcomes of, for example, ‘the character and capacity of the 
state’ (see Leftwich, 1996), ‘political settlements’ (see Khan, 2010) or ‘political parties’ (see Keefer, 2011). A review of 
these and many other concepts falls outside the scope of the current paper, the purpose of which is to provide a first 
empirical analysis of the impact of democracy on crisis growth at a cross-country and hence highly aggregated level
[10]   Barro (1996), among others, finds empirical evidence for the Lipset hypothesis that prosperity promotes democ-
racy. More recently however, Acemoglu et al. (2008) have shown that the positive relationship between per capita in-
come and democracy disappears from the data when one introduces country fixed effects or instruments income with 
past savings rates or weighted average income of a country’s trading partners. They suggest that per capita income 
and democracy evolve simultaneously and are driven by underlying historical factors.11 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
3.2.  Democracy and growth volatility
Somewhat less contentious is the link between democracy and economic stability. 
Contrasting Lee Kwan Yu’s Singapore and Chung Hee Park’s South Korea with Idi Amin’s Uganda, 
Sah (1991) famously noted that, because of human fallibility, centralised societies (like those 
marked by dictatorship) will typically have more volatile performances; in societies where many 
people are involved in decision-making (like democracies) the risk coming from such fallibility 
is much better diversified, it was argued. Likewise, Rodrik (2000) asserts that participatory 
political regimes induce greater willingness for cooperation and conciliation, translating into 
economic stability. Almeida and Ferreira (2002) corroborate Sah’s and Rodrik’s conjectures 
empirically, showing that autocracies exhibit greater growth rate volatility than democracies, 
both in cross-country and within-country time series terms. They argue that autocracies are 
also more diverse in selected institutional and policy measures such as government spending 
on education, property rights protection and business regulation. Further empirical evidence 
comes from Mobarak (2005) who shows that democracy significantly lowers growth volatility, 
which indirectly increases average long-term growth. A negative direct effect of democracy on 
growth however counteracts the positive impact via the volatility channel, hence making the net 
effect on growth insignificant. Yang (2008) uses dynamic panel analysis to test the robustness 
of the democracy-stability link; he demonstrates that the dampening effect of democracy on 
growth volatility is strongly apparent in ethnically fragmented societies only, where reaching 
compromise is harder because of collective action problems (as argued by Rodrik, 2000).
While the foregoing is certainly informative, it does not tell us explicitly how 
different political regimes in developing countries are expected to perform when faced with 
crisis and/or external shocks, like those triggered by a global economic downturn. This will be 
the subject of the remainder of this section.
3.3.  Democracy and crisis / external shocks
From a theoretical point of view, democracy could be either growth-retarding or 
growth-enhancing in times of economic turbulence. We identify at least five arguments that 
have been touted in the political economy literature on crisis and crisis management, of which 
the first two seem to speak in favour of autocratic (i.e. less or non-democratic) regimes and the 
latter three are in support of democracy.11
First of all, democracies have (almost by definition) more ‘checks and balances’ in 
place, which could slow down their reaction to an unfolding economic crisis; autocracies may 
exhibit more flexibility and decisiveness in crisis management, due to a greater concentration 
of legislative and executive power (if a separation of powers exists at all). Such reasoning is, for 
example, implicit in the work of Tsebelis on the role of ‘veto players’, individual or collective actors 
whose agreement is necessary for policy change, in decision making processes in various political 
systems. Tsebelis (1995:294) contends that the potential for changing the status quo in policy 
decreases with the number of such veto players (which is larger in democracies), and that this 
could be possibly harmful when ‘an exogenous shock disturbs a desirable process’. Comparable 
propositions can be deducted, albeit more indirectly, from Alesina and Drazen’s (1991) famous 
‘war-of-attrition’ model; these authors suggest that countries with political institutions limiting 
[11]   Most of the following arguments rely on the (plausible) assumption that the content and implementation of 
a country’s policy responses to crises and/or external shocks are conditioned by its overall (politico-) institutional 
set-up (see e.g. Tommasi, 2004; Stein et al., 2005; and more recently, Foresti et al., 2011). For a contrary view on the 
importance of political institutions for public policy, see Mulligan et al. (2004).12 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
the veto rights of groups that could oppose policy changes face less delays in the adoption of 
(perhaps urgently needed) reforms. Similarly, Aghion et al. (2004), who construct a model of 
endogenous political institutions, show theoretically that the optimal degree of ‘insulation’ of a 
country’s leadership, defined as the threshold majority of individuals (read: voters) required to 
block reform, is higher during crises.
Second, the same mechanisms that are credited with overcoming possible policy 
stalemates, i.e. fewer checks and balances, also enable autocracies to overrule the populist 
demands one can anticipate when the economy comes under pressure. To the extent that these 
populist demands lead to the adoption of suboptimal reforms weakening economic growth 
(much in the same way as touted in the classic literature on democracy and long-term growth; 
see before), autocracies may more successfully adjust. Democracies, where politicians are held 
accountable by their electorate (and seek re-election), might be unable to counter the general 
public’s antagonism to tough decisions. 
Other arguments point in the opposite direction. First, it has often been contended 
that the view that institutional constraints on a country’s executive are a major impediment for 
reform is too simplistic and neglects the importance of ‘credibility’ for the actual implementation 
and maintenance of reform efforts (Pitlik, 2005). Only when a regime can credibly commit to a 
proposed reform programme (including e.g. compensations schemes for prospective losers), 
it will be able to get the cooperation of its citizens and convince the markets. Autocracies are 
generally assumed to have a harder time than democracies in building such credibility, as the 
typical lack of checks and balances in the former undermines the belief that the executive will 
not renege on its previous (reform) commitments.12  This may put autocracies at a disadvantage 
in dealing with crises. Cox and McCubbins (2001) hence see a trade-off between decisiveness, 
which decreases with the number of veto players, and the credibility of commitment to policy 
(or what they call ‘resoluteness’), which increases in the number of vetoes. Pitlik (2005) thinks 
such a trade-off may be overstated; he theorises that a situation of more veto players, and thus 
greater credibility, also increases decisiveness, since regimes that know in advance that their 
commitments are not credible may shy away from policy changes that require the public’s belief 
in them to be successful in the first place.
A second important argument in favour of, or at least not against democracy is 
that autocratic leaders may well be not as ‘enlightened’ as hoped for in their (perhaps more 
determined) reaction to a crisis. Easterly (2011) explains that the nowadays popular narrative 
of the ‘benevolent autocrat’ naively assumes its omniscience about what policy drives growth, 
next to its omnipotence in translating this into practice. He rightly argues that there is simply no 
plausible reason why autocrats would hold the magic formula to economic success, something 
that has left economists scratching their heads for centuries. Certainly, democracies suffer from 
similar knowledge gaps, but at least they ensure that more voices are heard and that the room 
for arbitrary decisions is restricted.13 
Third, while not accountable to the general public, autocracies are certainly not 
immune to rent-seeking by interest groups. Research on political survival by Bueno de Mesquita 
et al. (2002) puts forward the size of the ‘winning coalition’, i.e. the number of people whose 
support is needed to keep the executive in office, as one of the distinguishing features of political 
regimes and shows that it matters for policy. The theory goes that regimes with small coalitions, 
[12]    The classic reference here is the work of North and Weingast (1989) on 17th century England.
[13]   One could think of this as the popular dictum that ‘many know more than one’.13 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
such as most autocracies, will focus on serving the desires of their narrow clique of supporters, 
at the expense of public good provision. When the demands of   that clique do not coincide with 
those of the economy as a whole, autocracies may end up promoting policy that is bad for growth. 
For the specific context of a financial crisis, Keefer (2007) presents a model where the presence 
of multiple veto players reduces the pay-offs to rent-seeking by special interest groups, thereby 
offsetting any delays in crisis response these extra checks and balances may cause.
Empirical cross-country studies on the topic of democracy and shock resilience are 
relatively scant, at least in the context of global, synchronised external shocks and crisis. One 
notable exception is Rodrik (1999a) who uses the turbulent second half of the 1970s as a test case 
to probe why some countries suffered greatly from adverse changes in their external environment 
while others did not, or hardly so. Above all, Rodrik’s study emphasises the importance of the 
interplay between external shocks (terms-of-trade deteriorations in particular) and ‘latent social 
conflict’, proxied by measures of income inequality and ethnic and linguistic fragmentation, as 
well as the interaction of shocks with domestic institutions of conflict management. Included 
in the latter category are composite indices of the institutional quality of government and 
democracy. It turns out that more democratic countries did a better job in fending off economic 
troubles brewing in the world economy during the 1970s. Applying the same logic to 1970-
1997 panel data, Acemoglu et al. (2003) uncover that when the world economy slows down, 
‘institutionally weak’ societies, such as those with less constraints on the executive (i.e. less 
democratic), suffer more in terms of growth than other, ‘institutionally stronger’ societies. 
No such democratic advantage is found for the impact of slowing world growth on the growth 
volatility of individual countries. Collier et al.’s (2006) explorative 1960-2004 panel analysis of 
country factors of exposure and resilience to various external (and domestic) shocks reveals that 
democracy has a mixed effect; democratic features seem to reduce the consequences of both 
favourable and unfavourable export price shocks (hence working like insurance), but amplify oil 
import shocks.
Extending our scope beyond purely external shocks that are global in nature, we 
find further evidence on the role of political institutions in crisis management coming from three 
related strands of literature: applied research on (idiosyncratic) banking, currency and twin 
crises (which can have domestic and/or external origins) (e.g. Keefer, 2002; 2007; Montinola, 
2003; Faust, 2003; Cavallo and Cavallo, 2010); small-N studies of regional crises such as the Latin 
American debt crisis of the 1980s (e.g. Remmer, 1990) and the East Asian crisis of the late 1990s 
(e.g. Haggard and MacIntyre, 1998); and the extensive literature on economic policy reform and 
structural adjustment (e.g. Lindenberg and Devarajan, 1993; Haggard and Webb, 1993; Alesina 
et al., 2006). In general terms, most of these empirical accounts suggest, if anything, that 
(established) democracies have been more resilient to various kinds of shocks and crises than 
autocracies.14
Recent descriptions of China’s growth experience during the 2008-2009 crisis 
seem to defy the main conclusions of the aforementioned empirical studies, as indicated by 
the opening quote to this paper. Without downplaying important macroeconomic and financial 
factors such as China’s comfortable current account position, relatively closed capital account, 
the large fiscal space available, and its huge ‘war chest’ of foreign exchange reserves, Wolf 
(2009), Andronova Vincelette et al. (2010), Schmidt and Heilmann (2010) and Pei (2011), like 
many other commentators, have emphasised the extraordinary size and swiftness of fiscal and 
[14]   The study of Alesina et al. (2006), showing that  countries where the executive is less constrained adjust more 
rapidly and drastically from inflation and budgetary crises, is clearly an exception.14 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
monetary measures taken by Chinese authorities.15 Arguably, such bold actions would have 
been harder to pull off in a multi-party state fully accountable to the general public’s demands.
Of course, whether democratic features, on average, have helped or retarded 
growth during the latest global crisis in a broader sample of developing countries remains to be 
empirically tested. Does the actual data from around the 2008-2009 crisis support the results 
of earlier analysis such as Rodrik (1999a)’s, or is it more in line with the popular interpretation 
of China’s story? In the next section we outline our methodological approach to find out and 
describe the different variables used.
[15]   In November 2008, the Chinese government announced a two-year fiscal stimulus package amounting to Y4 
trillion (or nearly US$590 billion; over 12 percent of 2009 GDP), most of it under the form of new and front-loaded in-
frastructure investment. All this was coupled with an enormous increase in new bank lending, supported by a radical 
easing of monetary policy (lifting credit quotas and a repeated slashing of interest rates). For more details on China’s 
response to the global crisis, see Andronova Vincelette (2010), Schmidt and Heilmann (2010) and references therein.15 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
4.  Methodoloy and data
4.1.  Baseline model set-up, sample and variables 
To evaluate the impact of democracy on crisis growth we will use simple OLS, 
estimating a multivariate cross-sectional model of the following form:
Ŷi,0809 - Ŷi,0607 = β0 + β1Yi,07 + β2Ŷi,0407 + β3Ŷi,trend + β4Xi + β5Democi + εi
where the left-hand side is the percentage point difference in real GDP per capita 
growth16 between 2009 and 200717 for country i; Yi,07 is the logarithm of GDP per capita in 2007 
(in current US$); Ŷi,0407 is average real GDP per capita growth over 2004-2007, a measure of the 
growth run-up in the period immediately preceding the crisis; Ŷ i,trend is average real GDP per 
capita growth over 1990-2007 (or 1995-2007 in the case of some CEE and former Soviet countries 
with missing data, conform Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011); Xi is a vector that includes a range of 
macroeconomic, financial and institutional control variables (see further); Democi is a measure 
of democracy for country i; and εi is a well-behaved error term. To reduce endogeneity concerns 
we take 2007 values for our control and democracy variables (thereby following the majority of 
studies reviewed in section 2).
Our sample consists of the 150 non-advanced countries that are classified by the 
IMF as ‘emerging and developing countries’ in its October 2010 World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
database (see Appendix, Table A1 for a list by income class).18 We choose to exclude the group of 
most advanced economies from our analysis, as the crisis impacted (most of) these countries in 
very particular ways (e.g. the role of real estate bubbles and busts and cross-holdings of toxic 
assets), which would complicate comparison. For many advanced countries, the crisis of 2008-
2009 cannot be regarded as an exogenous event.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the dependent variable of our choice for the full 
sample. Around 71 percent of developing countries experienced real GDP per capita growth in 
2009 that was between 10 and 0 percentage points lower than in 2007; the growth of 16 percent 
of countries collapsed with more than 10 percentage points; and only 13 percent saw an increase 
in real GDP per capita growth between 2007 and 2009. Even within the -10 to 0 percentage point 
change interval there appears to be substantial variation.
[16]   Ŷi,0809 is defined as log((2009 GDP per capita in constant LCU)/(2008 GDP per capita in constant LCU)) x100 and Ŷi,0607 
similarly. Since we deal with developing countries, where population growth is often substantial, we opt to rely on per 
capita growth rather than total growth as our preferred output measure. We aim to explain changes in growth rather 
than growth per se to take into account that countries were growing at very different rates before the crisis (see Didier 
et al., 2011).
[17]   We follow Berg et al. (2011) in choosing 2007-2009 as our ‘crisis time frame’ since 2007 could be seen as the last 
year where developing country growth was not majorly affected, 2008 being a transitional year. We rely on annual 
growth figures rather than quarterly data as the latter is only publicly available for advanced and a number of emerg-
ing economies (see Llaudes et al., 2010).
[18]  For three countries (Kosovo, Montenegro and Trinidad and Tobago) no population figures and therefore no GDP 
per capita data were available from the IMF WEO database.16 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
Figure 1: Distribution of crisis growth
Note: Author’s calculations based on IMF WEO database (October 2010 version).
The selection of pre-crisis macroeconomic, financial and institutional controls in 
our model is informed by the relevant literature (reviewed in section 2) as well as data availability 
for our specific sample of non-advanced countries: 2000-2007 cumulative growth of domestic 
credit to the private sector, trade openness, financial openness, financial depth (M2), current 
account balance (all expressed as percentages of GDP and multiplied by 100), a composite 
index of overall institutional quality based on the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators 
(WGI), and regional dummies. Detailed definitions and sources of these variables, together with 
descriptive statistics, are provided in Appendix, Table A2.
For our main variable of interest, the extent of democracy in a country, we initially 
use an index based on the 2007 (revised) combined Polity score (or polity2 variable) of the Polity 
IV Project database, a broad measure that is standard in the political economy literature. The 
Polity score is computed by subtracting an institutionalised autocracy from an institutionalised de-
mocracy indicator, which in turn have been derived as weighted sums of codings for the open-
ness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, regulation and competitiveness of participation and 
constraints on the chief executive (for more information on the construction of these (sub)indices, 
see Marshall et al., 2010). Our index converts the original score, ranging from -10 (strongly au-
tocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic), to an equivalent 21-point scale from 0 to 1. When testing 
for robustness of our results, we will also employ several other, often narrower measures of 
democracy (see section 5.2.5).17 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
4.2.  Bivariate correlations
Before reporting our regression results it is perhaps informative to have a look at 
simple bivariate correlations between the regressand and regressors and, in second instance, 
between pairs of regressors, of the model specified under section 4.1.
Panels (a) to (i) of Figure A1 in Appendix bring together a series of bivariate scatter 
plots, including a best linear fit, where crisis growth is set out against individual exploratory 
variables. For presentation purposes we have excluded extreme outliers. The correlation 
between log GDP per capita and crisis growth is clearly negative (see panel (a)), which reflects 
the fact that emerging, middle-income countries typically suffered larger growth collapses than 
low-income countries during the crisis (see e.g. Didier et al., 2011).19 Countries experiencing 
higher average pre-crisis and trend growth and cumulative domestic credit growth also did 
visibly worse (see panels (b)-(c)-(d)); this may point to the dangers of an overheating economy 
and an excessive build-up of credit.20 Panel (e) suggests that openness to trade was another 
factor of crisis exposure, which is again plausible in view of the enormous breakdown in world 
trade starting end-2008. Bivariate relations between crisis growth, on the one hand, and 
financial openness, financial depth (defined as M2 as a percentage of GDP) and the current 
account balance, on the other, appear hard to pin down (see panels (f)-(g)-(h)). Conversely, 
overall institutional quality, which can be expected to be highly correlated with GDP per capita, 
is again negatively associated with crisis growth.
Of special interest for the purpose of our paper is Figure 2, plotting the 2009-2007 
percentage point difference in real GDP per capita growth against the 2007 (Polity-based) 
democracy index for all 125 developing countries on which we have both kinds of data. It appears 
that there could be an overall negative (linear) relation between our baseline measures of crisis 
growth and democracy, although the slope coefficient is marginally insignificant at the 5 percent 
level (as evident from the confidence interval). A quadratic relation fits the data somewhat 
better, but this may well be due to the presence of certain outliers.21
Some democracies, most notably the Baltic states, Ukraine and Armenia, did fare 
very bad indeed during the crisis, in sharp contrast with more autocratic regimes such as those 
of Eritrea, Morocco, Zimbabwe and the Republic of Congo that actually improved their growth 
record during the crisis. Clearly, however, there are also a number of countries whose crisis 
experience flies in the face of an overall negative democracy-crisis growth relation, if any; the 
Comoros, Timor-Leste and Guinea-Bissau, all classified as relatively democratic, performed 
better in 2009 than in 2007, whereas autocratic oil-exporting Qatar, Azerbaijan and Bahrain 
did surely not.
[19]   This, in turn, may be due to the ‘industrial country nature’ of the crisis (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011); richer 
emerging markets are generally better connected/integrated with advanced economies, the epicentre of the 2008-
2009 crisis, than low-income countries. GDP per capita perhaps also proxies the size and complexity of the financial 
sector of a country. Of course, at least part of the negative correlation between log GDP per capita and crisis growth 
is due to the particular construction of the latter variable (see footnote 16).
[20]   Alternatively, the negative association between pre-crisis growth and crisis growth might proxy for certain 
country features, such as export concentration in products with a favourable price evolution in recent years (e.g. 
certain commodities) or overreliance on external finance, that have accounted for rapid growth in the booming years 
but turned into structural vulnerabilities during the bust. Again, the observed negative correlation between average 
pre-crisis growth and crisis growth is partly by construction.
[21]   The equation of the best linear fit is Y = -3.2486 - 3.7026X (p-value of F-test: 0.0541;  R2: 0.0298). The best quad-
ratic fit is the following: Y = -7.2336 + 19.1089X - 21.0106X2 (p-value of F-test: 0.0084;  R2: 0.0754).18 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
Figure 2: Crisis growth and democracy
Note: for country sample and corresponding country codes, see Table A1 in Appendix.
To be sure, as shown in our literature review in section 2, there is much more to growth 
differences during the crisis than simply the type of political regime. Additionally, some of these 
other country-level variables suggested to be impacting crisis growth may also be correlated 
with the degree of democracy. For one thing, democracies were perhaps better integrated into 
the world economy when the crisis hit and therefore more exposed to the resulting external 
shocks such as faltering trade and capital flow reversals. To get an idea of the relations between 
the exploratory variables used in our model, Table A3 in Appendix gives the lower triangle of 
the Pearson correlation matrix (with pairwise deletion of missing data) for these variables. The 
coefficients suggest that only the index for institutional quality is significantly (and positively) 
correlated (at the 5 percent level) with the Polity-based democracy measure.22 Other notable, 
positive correlations are those between log GDP per capita, trade openness, financial openness, 
financial depth and institutional quality.
Having described our empirical strategy and data in some detail, we will now 
examine the impact of democracy on crisis growth in a multivariate setting, thereby also 
considering the possibility of non-linear effects.
[22]   If we exclude oil exporters (using the IMF’s classification in its October 2007 WEO report), the positive pairwise 
correlation between democracy and institutional quality grows stronger, and also the correlation  between democ-
racy and log GDP per capita becomes positive and highly significant.19 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
5.  eMpirical results
5.1.  Baseline regressions 
Table 1 displays the OLS estimation results for our baseline model (see section 4.1). 
Below coefficient point estimates we report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Column 
1 of this table broadly confirms what we could expect and, to a fair degree, mirrors what earlier 
studies on cross-country growth differences during the latest crisis have found (see section 2). 
Countries with a higher per capita income, high average pre-crisis growth, rapid domestic credit 
to the private sector increases and those that were financially more integrated suffered larger 
growth declines. For example, a doubling of GDP per capita increases the backlash in growth 
between 2009 and 2007 with about 2 percentage points.23 A more comfortable current account 
position and deeper financial markets (greater monetisation) are on the contrary positively 
correlated with crisis growth performance. The influences of trend growth and trade openness 
are negative but not significant. Adding an extra control for the overall quality of a country’s 
institutions does not appreciably alter these outcomes (column 2); nor does the inclusion of 
regional dummies (bar from the current account balance effect now becoming statistically 
insignificant), all of which turn out to be of insignificant statistical importance themselves 
(column 3; coefficients of regional dummies not reported).24
Columns  4,  5  and  6  show  that  the  partial  correlation  between  democracy,  as 
measured  by  our  Polity-based  index,  and  crisis  growth  is  negative  and  highly  significant, 
whether or not institutional quality and regional dummies are included. The coefficients of the 
other control variables remain qualitatively similar to those in column 1-3, with the exception 
of the current account balance and trend growth. The point estimates imply that, ceteris paribus, 
an increase in the democracy index with 0.3, which is about one standard deviation in the 102 
country sample (or, say, the difference in democracy levels between Angola and Russia) worsens 
the growth downfall during the crisis by between 1.5 and 1.7 percentage points. 
Of course, the (negative) relation between democracy and crisis growth does not 
need to be linear. Strictly speaking, the democracy index we propose has only an ordinal meaning. 
Moreover, it is well possible that the true democracy-growth relation is subject to diminishing 
or increasing effects. In column 7 of Table 1 we therefore follow Barro (1996) in replacing the 
democracy index by two dummies. The first dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a country 
could be classified as an ‘anocracy’, i.e. has a Polity-based democracy index ranging from 0.35 
to 0.65, and equals 0 otherwise. The second, ‘democracy’ dummy equals 1 if the index exceeds 
0.65, and 0 otherwise. We see that both dummies come in significantly negative; the p-value 
for their joint significance is 0.0002. From the point estimates it would seem that the negative 
effect of democracy on crisis growth is diminishing at the margin. However, a simple Wald test 
rejects the null hypothesis of linearity, under which the coefficient of the second dummy should 
be approximately double that of the first, only at the 10 percent significance level. When, instead 
of using dummy variables, a squared democracy index is entered, its coefficient is positive (the 
level index itself remaining negative); the p-value for joint significance is then 0.0001. Again it 
[23]   Since GDP per capita is in log form, this is calculated as  ∆Y = β*∆X/X or ∆Y = -2.1172*100%.
[24]   We use dummies for five of the six World Bank regions: East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin 
America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa and South Asia. Sub-Saharan Africa is the reference region. 
Results are very similar when choosing alternative reference regions.20 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
appears that there are diminishing effects at play25, although high collinearity between the level 
and squared index makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions.26
Table 1: Baseline regression results
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP per capita (log), 2007 -2.1172*** -1.7775*** -1.5765*** -1.7951*** -1.6705*** -1.4129** -1.8001*** -1.9172***
[0.2797] [0.3898] [0.5010] [0.3141] [0.3998] [0.5470] [0.3973] [0.4049]
Av. GDP pc growth, 2004-2007 -0.7573*** -0.7499*** -0.7010*** -0.6290*** -0.6281*** -0.6002*** -0.5998*** -0.6339***
[0.1828] [0.1839] [0.1999] [0.1906] [0.1913] [0.1965] [0.1797] [0.1797]
Av. GDP pc trend growth -0.2000 -0.2146 -0.2146 -0.3655** -0.3672** -0.4116** -0.3947** -0.3402**
[0.1616] [0.1653] [0.1783] [0.1702] [0.1704] [0.1780] [0.1723] [0.1626]
Dom. credit growth, 2000-2007 -0.0215** -0.0222** -0.0220* -0.0258** -0.0259** -0.0251** -0.0260*** -0.0261**
[0.0098] [0.0098] [0.0117] [0.0101] [0.0101] [0.0115] [0.0099] [0.0101]
Trade openness, 2007 -0.0027 -0.0013 0.0000 -0.0089 -0.0078 -0.0046 -0.0071 -0.0074
[0.0102] [0.0102] [0.0103] [0.0100] [0.0107] [0.0120] [0.0100] [0.0102]
Financial openness, 2007 -0.0102*** -0.0101*** -0.0107*** -0.0108*** -0.0108*** -0.0108*** -0.0109*** -0.0106***
[0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0005]
M2 (% of GDP), 2007 0.0458*** 0.0489*** 0.0459*** 0.0491*** 0.0500*** 0.0612*** 0.0524*** 0.0515***
[0.0121] [0.0113] [0.0128] [0.0110] [0.0107] [0.0130] [0.0097] [0.0101]
CAB (% of GDP), 2007 0.0870*** 0.0739** 0.0545 0.0155 0.0129 0.0167 0.0184 0.0139
[0.0299] [0.0308] [0.0375] [0.0440] [0.0435] [0.0495] [0.0418] [0.0436]
Institutional quality, 2007 -1.0722 -1.1006 -0.4233 -0.4491 -0.5994 -1.0483
[0.8057] [0.8590] [0.8159] [0.8591] [0.7911] [0.8884]
Polity index, 2007 -5.0346*** -4.8527*** -5.7131*** -20.1297***
[1.2668] [1.2122] [1.6679] [6.9069]
Anocracy dummy, 2007 -3.3091***
[0.9785]
Democracy dummy, 2007 -3.9213***
[0.9386]
Polity index squared, 2007 14.1820**
[6.3529]
Regional dummies No No Yes No No Yes No No
Observations 115 115 115 102 102 102 102 102
R2 0.6804 0.6852 0.6949 0.7150 0.7157 0.7263 0.7280 0.7271
Adjusted R2 0.6562 0.6582 0.6522 0.6871 0.6844 0.6785 0.6948 0.6937
p-value (F-test) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Dependent variable is the 2009-2007 percentage point change in real GDP per capita growth. All models are estimated using OLS and 
include a constant term (coefficient not reported). Heteroskedasticity-robust (Huber-White) standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: 
***1%  **5%  *10%.
[25]   The turning point, after which democracy starts to improve crisis growth, lies at a democracy index of  around 
0.70 for this model (corresponding to levels of democracy in Russia, Nigeria and Papua New Guinea).
[26]   If we, alternatively, insert centred versions (around the sample mean) of the level and squared democracy index 
(to reduce structural collinearity), the level index loses its significance.21 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
Figure 3 plots the partial residuals of the regression in column 8 (omitting 
contributions of the democracy index and its square) against the level democracy index.27 As 
is shown once more, the choice between a linear and quadratic functional relationship is not 
straightforward, with the latter fitting the data perhaps only marginally better than the former. 
Indeed, a number of countries with relatively high Polity scores, most notably Armenia and 
Ukraine, continue to have very large negative crisis growth residuals.
Figure 3: Partial crisis growth residuals and democracy
Note: for country sample and corresponding country codes, see Table A1 in Appendix.
Our results up to now suggest that, on average, democratic country features were 
negatively correlated with economic growth performance during the 2008-2009 crisis (whether 
or not with diminishing effects at the margin). As evident from section 3.3, this bucks the trend of 
most earlier studies that have examined countries’ resilience against external shocks and crisis, 
but, on the other hand, seems to give some credence to the popular story of Chinese autocrats’ 
successful crisis management.
In the following subsection we attempt to shine some light on the robustness of 
our baseline model findings. We experiment, in turn, with five categories of robustness checks: 
changes in the set of controls, other estimators, the use of different country subsamples, 
alternative  definitions  for  crisis  growth  (our  dependent  variable),  and  various  alternative 
democracy measures (our variable of interest). For reasons of brevity we restrict ourselves 
to testing the specific set-up in Table 1, column 5 (including institutional quality; no regional 
dummies or non-linear effects), the results of which are reproduced for comparison in the first 
column of each of the robustness results tables in Appendix (Table A4-A8). Above all, our focus 
will be on what happens to the statistical and economic significance of the democracy coefficient 
when switching between specifications.
[27]   The partial residuals are calculated using the estimated coefficients from a regression that incorporates all 
variables, including the level and squared democracy index, i.e. the regression coefficients in column 8. Logically, the 
contributions from the democracy variables themselves are not taken into account in the calculation of these partial 
residuals (see Barro, 1996:14-15, footnote 16).22 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
5.2.  Robustness tests
5.2.1.  Changes in control variables
Table A4 in Appendix collects the results of specifications in which we have altered 
the original set of control variables. First of all, one potential problem with our baseline model, 
as already alluded to in section 4.2 (footnotes 19 and 20), is the inherent bias caused by the 
overlap in time periods between the dependent variable, on the one hand, and explanatory 
variables log GDP per capita, average pre-crisis growth and average trend growth on the other. 
Column 2 of Table A4 shows that our main findings also hold when replacing the original controls 
in question by log GDP per capita for 2005, average pre-crisis growth for 2002-2005 and average 
trend growth for 1990-2005 (or 1995-2005 in the case of some CEE and former Soviet countries); 
the negative correlation of democracy with crisis growth is still highly significant and actually 
slightly stronger.
Second, an alternative measure for institutional quality is constructed with data 
from the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group’s International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). We 
average three (annual) ICRG scores that evaluate countries on their protection of property and 
contract rights and their efficiency in public good allocation (see Knack and Keefer, 1995): law and 
order, corruption and bureaucratic quality.28 This leaves us with an composite index ranging from 
0 to 6, with higher values signalling superior institutional quality. As is noticeable from column 
3 of Table A4, substitution of the original WGI-based index for institutional quality by the new 
ICRG index only further increases the size of the estimated democracy coefficient.
Third, we try a number of variations on the financial openness variable, which 
we defined very broadly as the sum of total external assets and liabilities over GDP. In view 
of its skewed cross-sectional distribution, we replace the original financial openness variable 
by its logarithmic transformation (column 4). The transformed variable still exerts a negative 
influence on crisis growth, although its statistical significance is much lower now. Next we look 
at the impact of the net foreign assets (NFA) position instead of the mere size of a country’s 
international balance sheet (column 5). The NFA coefficient is negative and significant, but 
this significance disappears if we exclude the current account balance variable from the model 
(which is highly collinear with NFA; see also Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011). Splitting financial 
openness in its FDI, portfolio equity, debt and foreign reserves components learns that the 
effect of openness on crisis growth may differ according to the specific component one considers 
(column 6).29 None of these alterations seems to have any discernable effect on the democracy 
coefficient. When including reserves measured in months of imports next to financial openness 
(from which we naturally leave out the reserves asset component), or substituting financial 
openness altogether by the ratio of international bank claims of BIS-reporting banks to GDP from 
the Bank of International Settlements’ consolidated banking statistics (a proxy for countries’ 
vulnerability to banking credit shocks), the coefficient of our democracy variable somewhat 
changes; its negative sign and high statistical significance level however remain (column 7-8).
[28]   Knack and Keefer (1995) originally also included scores on expropriation risk and repudiation of contracts by 
government in their composite ICRG index. These latter two scores are, to our knowledge, not available for recent 
years (see PRS Group, 2011).
[29]   We make abstraction of the financial derivatives component of financial openness since this typically constitutes 
only a marginal (if not zero) percentage of all assets and liabilities for our sample of developing countries. Further 
investigation of the respective importance of FDI, portfolio equity, debt and reserves positions for crisis growth falls 
outside the scope of this paper.23 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
Lastly, in column 9 and 10, we add two more variables that could possibly have 
a bearing on crisis growth, stock market capitalisation and the general government’s fiscal 
balance, respectively. Again the results are very similar to those of our baseline model.
Altogether, none of the changes in controls we have just presented appears to 
detract from the negative correlation between democracy and crisis growth we found earlier.
5.2.2.  Other estimators
Table A5 in Appendix shows our results when employing other estimators. First, 
in column 2, we use Stata’s ‘robust regression’ algorithm (rreg command), which provides 
an iteratively reweighted alternative to simple OLS. After estimating OLS, this algorithm 
calculates for each observation Cook’s D (a measure combining information about its leverage 
and residual) and drops all observations with D larger than 1. Then, an iterative process 
begins in which observation weights are derived from absolute residuals (using first Huber, 
and then Tukey bisquare weighting functions); this process stops when the maximum change 
in the weights of one iteration to the next falls below a certain threshold. While such ‘robust 
regression’ yields less efficient results than OLS, it weighs down outliers and other excessively 
influential observations, which could be an important problem in our rather limited sample (see 
also Figures 2 and 3). From column 2 of Table A5 it can be seen that, although the coefficient 
of our baseline democracy index becomes smaller, the index retains its statistical significance; 
and so do all other regressors, apart from trend growth (trade openness, on the other hand, 
gains significance). A one-standard-deviation increase in the democracy index now lowers crisis 
growth by about 1.1 percentage points. Outliers may indeed have an effect on our findings, but at 
first sight do not drive the negative democracy-crisis growth relation we uncover.30
Certainly, all the foregoing does not necessarily imply that democracy has a 
negative causal effect on the differences in growth between 2009 and 2007. As is well-established 
in the econometrics literature, correlation does not equate causation. Indeed, the possibility 
of spurious correlation, whereby the negative democracy-crisis growth relation in our model 
merely reflects the correlation of both these variables with a third, unobserved factor, is non-
negligible. With such third factors omitted, the OLS estimator would be biased and inconsistent. 
One (popular) way to mitigate these and other potential problems, such as measurement error, 
in a cross-country setting as ours is by means of instrumental variable (IV) estimation. The IV 
estimator is consistent, although never unbiased and less efficient than OLS, when employing 
variables (instruments) that are both uncorrelated with the error term of the model (instrument 
exogeneity) and correlated with the assumingly endogenous variable being instrumented 
(instrument relevance). Finding valid instruments that satisfy these two conditions is however 
always a daunting task.
Here we have experimented with two types of instruments: first, variables linked to 
historical Western influence in developing countries, more specifically the fraction of a country’s 
population having one of five primary Western European languages as mother tongue and 
the average temperature in degrees Celsius; and second, earlier values of Polity measures for 
democracy, in particular an index averaging combined Polity scores for the years 2000-2006.31  
[30]   In our model, the robust regression algorithm ultimately results in Armenia being assigned a weight of zero. 
Also the influences of Ukraine, Latvia and the Republic of Congo are heavily discounted, with respective weights of  
0.014, 0.099 and 0.112.
[31]   For more on definitions and sources of these instruments, see Table A2 in Appendix.24 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
The logic underlying the language instrument (originally from Hall and Jones, 1999) is that it 
proxies the extent to which Western Europe, mainly through colonisation, exerted influence on a 
country’s ‘social infrastructure’, including the transmission of ideas and practices of democratic 
government. In a related manner, much has been written (most famously by Acemoglu et al. 
2001) about how Western European colonisers were more likely to settle and replicate, among 
other institutions, systems of checks and balances in climates similar of their own, i.e. with a 
similar disease environment and, perhaps also, similarly moderate temperatures. This would 
suggest that, through an historical lock-in of more participatory political institutions, both 
language and mean temperature are correlated with current democracy levels (the former 
positively and the latter negatively) but, conditional on the control variables included in our 
model, not directly with crisis growth. Additionally, earlier values of (Polity-based) democracy 
measures could instrument for current values if one assumes that earlier states of democracy do 
not affect crisis growth beyond their effect on current states of democracy.
Columns 3-6 of Table A5 present the outcomes of the above-described IV approach 
using two-stage least squares (2SLS). In column 3 we instrument democracy only by the Western 
European language variable. The coefficient of democracy is now very imprecisely estimated, 
making it difficult to say something about the direction of democracy’s net effect, if any, on crisis 
growth. This impreciseness could be due to the relatively low explanatory power of the language 
instrument in the first-stage regression, which is apparent from the reported partial R2 statistic. 
Column  4  adds  mean  temperature  as  an  extra  instrument;  we  find  that  the  IV-estimated 
democracy coefficient is negative, although economic and statistical significance are lower than 
those of the OLS estimate. The partial R2 is improved but the first-stage F statistic falls to 12.45, 
only just above the oft-suggested rule-of-thumb critical value of 10 (e.g. Stock et al., 2002). This 
points at the possibility of our instruments being ‘weak’, i.e. not sufficiently relevant, which 
has been shown to lead to substantial asymptotic bias in the IV estimator, especially in small 
samples (Nelson and Startz, 1990; Bound et al., 1995).32 On the positive side, however, the Hansen 
J test (a generalised, heteroskedasticity-robust version of the Sargan test) indicates that the 
null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected. Therefore, if we assume 
one of our two instruments to be uncorrelated with the error term, the other is exogenous too. 
Since the two instruments used fit into a similar story of historical Western influence we could 
deduct that they are both likely to be true sources of exogenous variation.33 A standard Wu-
Hausman test34 fails to reject at conventional significance levels the null of our exploratory 
variable of interest, the Polity measure of democracy, being exogenous for the model set-ups in 
column 3 and 4; an OLS estimator, which is more efficient, would thus be more appropriate. Of 
course, the possible ‘weakness’ of our instruments casts some doubts about the validity of such 
an endogeneity test. 
Alternatively, we attempt an IV estimator with the average 2000-2006 Polity score 
as an instrument, either on its own (column 5) or in combination with the language instrument 
(column 6). In both cases, the democracy coefficient holds it significance. What is more, the 
negative effect on crisis growth is estimated to be even stronger than indicated by the baseline 
[32]   More formally we have compared the F statistic of the corresponding model with normal standard errors, 9.30, 
with the critical values proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005) (only available for IV estimation without heteroskedastic-
ity correction). This suggests that the null of the joint influence of both instruments being zero can only be rejected at 
the 20 percent level (critical value: 8.75).
[33]   That the signs of  the coefficients of both instrumental variables in the first-stage regression are as predicted by 
theory (i.e. positive for the language instrument and negative for mean temperature) further strengthens our case.
[34]   We rely on a regression-based version of this test (as described in Wooldridge, 2006:483-484).25 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
OLS estimator; a one-standard-deviation increase in the Polity score corresponds here with a 
reduction in crisis growth of around 1.8 percentage points. From first-stage F statistics and partial 
R2s we observe that the relevance or ‘strength’ of this alternative instrument is incontestable. 
Yet, there can be serious reservations about the exogeneity assumption one needs to make; it 
is not self-evident that, taking at face value that our baseline democracy measure is correlated 
with the error term, earlier values are not (especially as Polity scores tend to vary relatively 
little over time). The Hansen J test for column 6, showing that the null of valid overidentifying 
restrictions is on the verge of being rejected at the 5 percent level, seems to bear out these 
problems of endogeneity for the earlier values instrument. Endogeneity is found to be an issue 
for the baseline OLS estimator, according to Wu-Hausman tests based on the models in column 
5 and 6, but using earlier Polity values may not be particularly helpful in resolving this.
All in all, the different instruments we have used shed some, but limited additional 
light on the existence, if any, of a causal relation between democracy levels and growth during 
the crisis. At a first glance, regression outputs indicate that negative correlations persist in three 
out of the four IV estimations presented35; further scrutiny however learns that these results 
should be taken with a pinch of salt because of potential problems of instrument irrelevance 
(in the case of the Western influence instruments) and instrument endogeneity (in the case 
of earlier value instruments). Clearly, more work, including a search for better instruments, is 
needed if we are to boost the credibility of  any IV estimates.
On the other hand, there are plausibly a number of grounds on which one could 
defend sticking to an OLS procedure here.36 First, as stated in the introduction, the main purpose 
of this paper is to augment the existing body of empirical literature on cross-country determinants 
of growth during the 2008-2009 crisis by studying the impact of democracy on crisis growth 
beyond that of other, mostly macroeconomic and financial variables already included in that 
literature. Since these earlier studies (surveyed in section 2) predominantly employ OLS, doing 
so too increases the comparability of our results (at least with respect to the variables we take 
up as controls in our model).37 And second, related to the preceding point, the influence of our 
baseline democracy measure appears to be statistically significant in the presence of previously 
used exploratory variables, including proxies for overall institutional quality, suggesting that 
the omitted variable bias in our OLS estimations may actually be lower than in other studies.38  
Hence, for the remaining robustness tests we will focus again on the baseline OLS estimator.
5.2.3.  Country subsamples
In Table A6 in Appendix we verify whether our results differ when restricting 
ourselves to certain developing country subsamples.39 It appears that the democracy-crisis 
growth relation, or at least its overall direction, is largely insensitive to sample changes.
Excluding  countries  that  were  classified  by  the  IMF  as  oil  exporters  returns  a 
democracy coefficient that is even more negative (column 2). This should not come as a surprise 
since some of these oil exporting countries seem to defy the negative trend in Figure 2. Omission 
of the three Baltic states, where democracy and large growth downfalls have gone together 
[35]   We have tried several variations on the two IV approaches mentioned  (e.g. using log settler mortality rates, 
distance to equator or other lagged Polity measures), yielding comparable results but often even greater problems.
[36]   The following reasoning, to some extent, mirrors that of Knack and Keefer (1995).
[37]   In fact, only one out of the twelve studies surveyed, Blanchard et al. (2010), uses an IV estimator.
[38]   Most studies also include much fewer controls simultaneously in their regressions than we do here.
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(probably also for very specific reasons other than those captured by our control variables)40, 
slightly lowers the point estimate of the democracy coefficient in our model, as expected (column 
3).41 Columns 4-5 demonstrate that financial centres, as identified by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2011), or small (mostly island) states with a population of less than one million in 2007 also do 
not drive our main findings. 
Likewise, the statistical and economic significance of the democracy index survives 
the exclusion of the UN’s group of least developed countries (column 6), of high-income 
developing countries (column 7) or of both high-income and upper middle-income countries 
(column 8). Only if we limit our sample to low-income countries (column 9), effectively reducing 
the number of observations to less than 30, the statistical significance of the coefficient of 
democracy is reduced (as is the case with the coefficients of log GDP per capita and financial 
depth; conversely, the coefficient of the current account balance turns highly significant).
5.2.4.  Other crisis growth measures
In columns 2-4 of Table A7 in Appendix we substitute our preferred dependent 
variable for crisis growth, the percentage point difference in real GDP per capita growth between 
2009 and 2007, in turn by the 2009-2008 percentage point change in real GDP per capita growth, 
real GDP per capita growth in 2009 and real GDP per capita growth in 2008. In the first two 
instances the influence of democracy remains significant but is slightly less negative than in 
our baseline model. So, no matter whether 2009 growth is expressed in relative or absolute 
terms, pre-crisis democracy levels appear negatively correlated with it. When only 2008 growth 
is considered, the model looses most of its explanatory power, in line with expectations (see 
footnote 17).
5.2.5.  Other democracy measures
As a last series of robustness tests, a number of alternative democracy measures 
are tried in Table A8. In column 2 the overall Polity score index is replaced by another 0-to-1 
index based on the Polity score’s underlying institutionalised democracy indicator (see section 4.1 
and Marshall et al., 2010); column 3 does the same for Polity’s institutionalised autocracy indica-
tor (for which there is no overlap in codings with the institutionalised democracy indicator). It 
turns out that the net negative effect of our baseline Polity index is the result of both a nega-
tive correlation of democratic country features with crisis growth and a positive correlation of 
autocratic characteristics with such growth, the latter being slightly stronger than the former 
according to point estimates in columns 2-3.42 In column 4, we draw on yet another oft-used 
Polity subcomponent, constraints on chief executive, which more narrowly measures the extent of 
institutionalised restraints on the decision-making powers of a country’s chief executives, be it 
individuals or collective bodies, and ranges from 1 (‘unlimited authority’) to 7 (‘executive parity 
or subordination’). We find that more constraints leads to significantly lower crisis growth.
[40]   For the case of Latvia, for example, Blanchard et al. (2010) point to the important role of foreign ownership of 
the country’s banks (especially controlled by Nordic parent banks) and a domestic housing boom/bust in addition to 
a huge pre-crisis run-up in domestic credit and large current account deficit (two factors which we do capture in our 
model).
[41]   If we exclude both oil exporters and Baltic states, the point estimate of the democracy coefficient becomes 
-5.1933, remaining highly significant.
[42]   If we include both indicators together as regressors (which are, of course, highly collinear), only the institution-
alised autocracy indicator’s coefficient remains significant (results not reported).27 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
Column 5 of Table A8 replaces our Polity-based measures with the voice and 
accountability score of WGI, the single dimension we left out to construct our baseline index for 
overall institutional quality and finds it again negatively correlated with crisis growth.
Next, we employ the democracy dummy from the Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) 
dataset (see Cheibub et al., 2010), which is sometimes argued to be more objective (but less 
comprehensive) compared to Polity scores. The DD dummy reveals that countries classified 
as non-democracies would outperform democracies with otherwise similar macroeconomic, 
financial and institutional features by about two percentage points of crisis growth, i.e. a growth 
difference slightly larger than that corresponding with a one-standard-deviation change in our 
baseline index (see section 5.1).
Column 7 uses the well-known checks and balances variable, counting the number of 
effective veto points in a country’s political system, from the Database of Political Institutions 
(DPI) (see Beck et al., 2001). Again the results are qualitatively similar to our earlier findings and 
very much in line with the theoretical arguments we presented in section 3.3.43 The results in 
column 16 indicate that, on average, one additional veto point in the political constellation of a 
country reduces crisis growth with almost 0.9 percentage points.
Our last alternative measure for democracy is constructed from Freedom House’s 
Freedom in the World database, which evaluates countries on their political rights and civil lib-
erties and gives scores from 1 to 7 (with 7 corresponding to the least free places) (see Freedom 
House, 2008). To increase comparability with the baseline, we reverse the original scale and 
standardise political rights and civil liberties scores to 0-to-1 indices (with 1 meaning completely 
free); we then take simple averages of the two indices to obtain a combined ‘freedom’ index. 
Column 8 in Table A3 shows that also the partial correlation of this freedom index with crisis 
growth is negative.
In sum, from the preceding battery of tests it very much appears that the negative 
correlation between democracy and crisis growth we uncovered earlier is robust. The next 
subsection does some further probing in bringing possible interaction effects into consideration.
5.3.  Interaction effects
One could now wonder whether the (negative) correlation of democracy with 
crisis  growth  is  conditioned  by  the  prevailing  macro-economic,  financial  and  institutional 
environment. Perhaps democracy exerts a stronger (or weaker) effect on crisis growth in open 
economies.
Table 2 gives the regression results of our baseline model when we add multiplicative 
interaction terms of the Polity score with each of the other regressors (introduced one at a time). 
To ease interpretation of the coefficients we have centred variables around their sample mean 
before interacting them; the democracy coefficient then captures the impact of democracy on 
crisis growth when the variable it is interacted with is fixed at its sample mean.44
[43]   The regression results reported in column 16 exclude India, which is with 17 checks and balances in place a clear 
outlier; the next in line, the Solomon Islands, has only 8 veto points. The inclusion of India into the sample causes the 
coefficient of checks and balances to be not significantly different from zero.
[44]   Interacting uncentred variables produces coefficients that measure the effect of one variable when the other is 
kept at zero, which may not be particularly useful (see Braumoeller, 2004).28 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
Table 2: Regression results with interaction effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variable inter-




















M2 (% of 
GDP), 2007





X -1.6495*** -0.9649*** -0.6028** -0.0250** -0.0060 -0.0061 0.0515*** 0.0427 -0.4131
[0.4139] [0.1782] [0.2576] [0.0098] [0.0107] [0.0054] [0.0115] [0.0415] [0.7758]
Polity index, 2007 -5.0358*** -5.4767*** -5.1266*** -4.8665*** -4.5388*** -4.8196*** -5.2804*** -5.2918*** -5.1986***
[1.2073] [1.1972] [1.2345] [1.2228] [1.2106] [1.2003] [1.2705] [1.1892] [1.2837]
Polity index * X 0.7848 -1.4696*** -1.2267* -0.0436** -0.0426 0.0101 0.0737** 0.2355** 3.2705
[0.9924] [0.4602] [0.6480] [0.0218] [0.0268] [0.0111] [0.0358] [0.0990] [2.3034]
Observations 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102
R2 0.7173 0.7564 0.7359 0.7311 0.7199 0.7183 0.7238 0.7293 0.7224
Adjusted R2 0.6827 0.7266 0.7036 0.6983 0.6856 0.6839 0.6901 0.6962 0.6885
p-value (F-test) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Dependent variable is the 2009-2007 percentage point change in real GDP per capita growth. All models are estimated using OLS and 
include all (nine) baseline model controls and a constant term. Only coefficients of  Polity-based democracy measure, variable interacted with this 
measure, and multiplicative interaction term are reported.  Variables are centred around sample mean before interaction. Heteroskedasticity-
robust (Huber-White) standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***1%  **5%  *10%.
The first and foremost observation from columns 1-9 of Table 2 is that the overall 
negative correlation of democracy with crisis growth persists and cannot be fully ascribed to 
democracy’s interaction with one of the control variables of the baseline model (at least not 
at the sample mean values of these controls). That said, it seems as if the negative effect of 
democracy is further strengthened in an environment of rapid pre-crisis output and domestic 
credit growth (columns 2 and 4). Conversely, the negative impact of democracy on crisis growth 
appears to be somewhat attenuated when financial depth is high or the current account balance 
is sufficiently positive. The mechanisms that lay behind these possible non-linear relations are 
not directly clear to us and warrant more attention in future work.29 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
6.  ConCludIng remarks
This paper has examined whether democratic country features can explain part of 
the cross-country variation in 2008-2009 crisis growth performances across developing countries, 
thereby complementing other recent studies on the Great Recession which have looked almost 
exclusively at macroeconomic and financial variables. Evidence from simple OLS models hints at 
a statistically and economically significant negative correlation between democracy and crisis 
growth. We find this relation to be robust to the use of different sets of control variables, an 
iterative weighting algorithm for estimation, changes in the country sample, and alternative 
democracy and crisis growth definitions.
Our results seem to be in striking contrast with the conclusions of most earlier 
empirical studies on country resilience to external shocks and crisis (most notably, Rodrik, 
1999), which suggest that democracy helps countries in overcoming shocks and keeping up 
growth. Consequently, the paper is closer to the ‘autocratic advantage’ interpretation of China’s 
managing of the latest crisis. It is in line with theoretical hypotheses of checks and balances 
reducing flexibility and decisiveness in governments’ reaction to crisis and leaving room for 
populist demands to gain ground. That notwithstanding, there are a number of obvious but 
important caveats here that deserve mention.
First, the paper has not yet been able to fully take away concerns of spurious 
correlation. Although we have attempted to control for a large number of candidate ‘confounding’ 
factors (such as e.g. trade and financial openness), it is still possible that the negative democracy-
crisis growth relation is due to the correlation of both these variables with unobserved factors. 
Our initial experimentation with IV estimation suggests that, even when taking into account 
endogeneity issues, democracy can still be negatively linked to crisis growth.  The relevance and 
exogeneity of the instruments we have used could however be subject to critique. The search for 
better, valid instruments thus continues.
Second, even if causation would be more firmly established, our results do not 
at all imply that democracy is detrimental to overall, long-term growth (which would run 
counter to the conclusions, or better non-conclusions, of the vast body of research in this field). 
Neither should these findings, or any arguments in the paper, be interpreted as a manifesto for 
more autocracy. Rather, we simply find that, on average, democracy held back growth during 
one particular spell of global crisis, the Great Recession of 2008-2009. Next to their intrinsic 
values of accountability and legitimacy, democracies have been found to possess many other 
advantages over alternative political configurations, including a lower propensity to engage in 
conflict, a more equal redistribution of any growth dividends, and even higher life expectancy at 
birth and superior daily calorie intakes for their citizens (see e.g. Halperin et al., 2005; Rodrik, 
1999b; Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006; Blaydes and Kayser, 2011). It could well be possible that 
autocracies more unevenly distribute any costs that come with managing a crisis and keeping 
up growth temporarily. Autocracies are also generally marked by greater growth volatility (see 
section 3.2). Indeed, as Pei (2011:128) has noted in the context of China’s remarkable resilience 
during the crisis, ‘one should not confuse crisis management with sustainable development’. 
Likewise, ‘authoritarian variants [of capitalism] have more leeway to make large, rapid decisions 
but may suffer in the long run from problems of accountability and legitimacy’ (Fukuyama, 
2011:313). As time passes by and more data becomes available, it will be interesting to investigate 
how political institutions shape the medium- and longer-term growth paths of countries during 30 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
global recovery (or, perhaps, renewed bouts of crisis). 
Third, this paper has attempted to identify the overall, net effect of democracy on 
crisis growth, treating the underlying forces as a ‘black box’ yet to be opened. Why is it, for 
example, that democracy seems to have hindered growth during the latest crisis, whereas it 
was generally found a blessing during previous economically turbulent times? To borrow from 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), why could it be that ‘this time is different’? For many individual 
developing countries the Great Recession has been less severe than previous, more idiosyncratic 
crisis episodes (see Berg et al., 2011 on low-income countries). Perhaps decisiveness and flexibility 
matter more than the credibility of policy commitments when a crisis is relatively ‘moderate’, 
as suggested by Montinola’s (2003) study on banking crises resolution. Also, one can expect 
credibility to be less important in dealing with purely exogenous shocks, contrary to when a 
crisis has domestic origins too and the country’s regime, through earlier policy actions, bears 
(part of) the responsibility for it happening in the first place. All this is, of course, still highly 
speculative. Much more empirical research will be necessary to provide convincing answers to 
these questions and disentangle the exact channels through which democracy, in its various 
aspects, has influenced countries’ crisis growth. We have only just begun to scratch the surface.31 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
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Table A1: Country sample by World Bank income group
Notes: Country codes are official ISO alpha-3 codes. Income group classification based on 2007 GNI per capita in US$ (Atlas method) is the fol-
lowing: low-income (<= 935), lower middle-income (936 - 3,705), upper middle-income (3,706 - 11,455), high-income (> 11,455). Since Kosovo only 
declared independence in 2008 it is ranked based on its 2008 GNI per capita (as a lower middle-income country). Countries in bold were classi-
fied as fuel exporters in the IMF’s WEO report (October 2007). Countries in italics were classified as financial centres in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2011). Countries underlined were listed by the UN as least developed (based on income, human asset and economic vulnerability criteria) in 2007. 
Regional classification is according to the World Bank: East Asia and Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and Carib-
bean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MNA), South Asia (SAS) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
DATASTATISTICS/Resources/OGHIST.xls.
  Low-income       Lower middle-
income       Upper middle-
income       High-income    
Country name Code Region   Country name Code Region   Country name Code Region Country name Code Region
1 Afghanistan, 
Islam. Rep. of      AFG       SAS 48 Albania ALB ECA 100 Argentina ARG LAC 137 Antigua and 
Barbuda ATG LAC
2 Bangladesh BGD SAS 49 Algeria DZA MNA 101 Belarus BLR ECA 138 Bahrain BHR MNA
3 Benin BEN SSA 50 Angola AGO SSA 102 Belize BLZ LAC 139 Barbados BRB LAC
4 Burkina Faso BFA SSA 51 Armenia ARM ECA 103 Botswana BWA SSA 140 Brunei Darussalam BRN EAP
5 Burundi  BDI SSA 52 Azerbaijan AZE ECA 104 Brazil BRA LAC 141 Equatorial Guinea GNQ SSA
6 Cambodia  KHM EAP 53 Bhutan BTN SAS 105 Bulgaria BGR ECA 142 Estonia EST ECA
7 Central African 
Republic  CAF SSA 54 Bolivia BOL LAC 106 Chile CHL LAC 143 Hungary  HUN ECA
8 Chad TCD SSA 55 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina BIH ECA 107 Costa Rica CRI LAC 144 Kuwait  KWT MNA
9 Comoros COM SSA 56 Cameroon CMR SSA 108 Croatia  HRV ECA 145 Oman OMN MNA
10 Congo, Dem. 
Rep. of COD SSA 57 Cape Verde CPV SSA 109 Dominica DMA LAC 146 Qatar QAT MNA
11 Côte d'Ivoire CIV SSA 58 China CHN EAP 110 Fiji FJI EAP 147 Saudi Arabia SAU MNA
12 Eritrea ERI SSA 59 Colombia COL LAC 111 Gabon GAB SSA 148 Bahamas, The BHS LAC
13 Ethiopia  ETH SSA 60 Congo, Rep. of COG SSA 112 Grenada GRD LAC 149 Trinidad and 
Tobago TTO LAC
14 Gambia, The GMB SSA 61 Djibouti DJI MNA 113 Jamaica JAM LAC 150 United Arab Emir. ARE MNA
15 Ghana  GHA SSA 62 Dominican Republic DOM LAC 114 Kazakhstan KAZ ECA
16 Guinea GIN SSA 63 Ecuador ECU LAC 115 Latvia LVA ECA
17 Guinea-Bissau GNB SSA 64 Egypt EGY MNA 116 Lebanon LBN MNA
18 Haiti HTI LAC 65 El Salvador SLV LAC 117 Libya LBY MNA
19 Kenya KEN SSA 66 Georgia GEO ECA 118 Lithuania LTU ECA
20 Kyrgyz Republic KGZ ECA 67 Guatemala GTM LAC 119 Malaysia MYS EAP
21 Lao PDR LAO EAP 68 Guyana GUY LAC 120 Mauritius MUS SSA
22 Liberia LBR SSA 69 Honduras HND LAC 121 Mexico MEX LAC
23 Madagascar MDG SSA 70 India IND SAS 122 Montenegro MNE ECA
24 Malawi  MWI SSA 71 Indonesia IDN EAP 123 Panama PAN LAC
25 Mali MLI SSA 72 Iran, Islam. Rep. of IRN MNA 124 Poland POL ECA
26 Mauritania MRT SSA 73 Iraq IRQ MNA 125 Romania ROU ECA
27 Mozambique  MOZ SSA 74 Jordan JOR MNA 126 Russia RUS ECA
28 Myanmar MMR EAP 75 Kiribati KIR EAP 127 Serbia SRB ECA
29 Nepal NPL SAS 76 Kosovo     UVK ECA 128 Seychelles SYC SSA
30 Niger  NER SSA 77 Lesotho LSO SSA 129 South Africa  ZAF SSA
31 Nigeria  NGA SSA 78 Macedonia, FYR MKD ECA 130 St. Kitts and Nevis KNA LAC
32 Pakistan  PAK SAS 79 Maldives MDV SAS 131 St. Lucia LCA LAC
33 Papua New Guinea PNG EAP 80 Moldova MDA ECA 132 St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines VCT LAC
34 Rwanda RWA SSA 81 Mongolia MNG EAP 133 Suriname SUR LAC
35 São Tomé and 
Príncipe STP SSA 82 Morocco MAR MNA 134 Turkey TUR ECA
36 Senegal   SEN SSA 83 Namibia NAM SSA 135 Uruguay URY LAC
37 Sierra Leone SLE SSA 84 Nicaragua NIC LAC 136 Venezuela VEN LAC
38 Solomon Islands SLB EAP 85 Paraguay PRY LAC    
39 Tajikistan TJK ECA 86 Peru PER LAC    
40 Tanzania TZA SSA 87 Philippines PHL EAP    
41 Togo  TGO SSA 88 Samoa WSM EAP    
42 Uganda  UGA SSA 89 Sri Lanka LKA SAS    
43 Uzbekistan  UZB ECA 90 Sudan SDN SSA    
44 Vietnam VNM EAP 91 Swaziland SWZ SSA    
45 Yemen, Rep. of YEM MNA 92 Syrian Arab 
Republic SYR MNA    
46 Zambia ZMB SSA 93 Thailand THA EAP    
47 Zimbabwe ZWE SSA 94 Timor-Leste, Dem. 
Rep. of TLS EAP    
  95 Tonga TON EAP    
  96 Tunisia TUN MNA    
  97 Turkmenistan TKM ECA    
  98 Ukraine UKR ECA    
        99 Vanuatu VUT EAP                Table A2: Variable definitions, sources and descriptive statistics
Variable name Definition Source Descriptive statistics
      Obs. Mean St. dev. Min. Max.
2009-2007 real GDP per capita growth change Percentage point difference between real GDP per capita growth in 2009 and 
real GDP per capita growth in 2007
Constructed from IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) online database (October 
2010 version) 147 -5.5344 6.6367 -31.7679 9.3109
2009-2008 real GDP per capita growth change Percentage point difference between real GDP per capita growth in 2009 and 
real GDP per capita growth in 2008
Constructed from IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) online database (October 
2010 version) 147 -3.9260 6.0382 -29.8342 26.4237
Real GDP per capita growth, 2009 Real GDP per capita growth in 2009 Constructed from IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) online database (October 
2010 version) 147 -1.0240 5.4058 -25.6972 17.6957
Real GDP per capita growth, 2008 Real GDP per capita growth in 2008 Constructed from IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) online database (October 
2010 version) 147 2.9019 3.8415 -20.8945 11.8105
GDP per capita (log), 2007 Natural logarithm of nominal GDP per capita in 2007 (in current US$) Constructed from IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) online database (October 
2010 version) 147 7.7377 1.3113 4.8292 11.0952
GDP per capita (log), 2005 Natural logarithm of nominal GDP per capita in 2005 (in current US$) Constructed from IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) online database (October 
2010 version) 147 7.4612 1.2995 4.6717 10.7882
Average GDP per capita growth, 2004-2007 Geometric mean of real GDP per capita growth over 2004-2007 Constructed from IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) online database (October 
2010 version) 145 4.2484 3.4759 -3.5575 24.0325
Average GDP per capita growth, 2002-2005 Geometric mean of real GDP per capita growth over 2002-2005 Constructed from IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) online database (October 
2010 version) 144 3.6625 3.4324 -11.8828 15.3324
Average GDP per capita trend growth Geometric mean of real GDP per capita growth over 1990-2007 (or 1995-2007 
for CEE and CIS countries with missing data)
Constructed from IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) online database (October 
2010 version) 134 2.5471 2.8123 -4.2350 18.7322
Average GDP per capita trend growth (alternative) Geometric mean of real GDP per capita growth over 1990-2005 (or 1995-2005 
for CEE and CIS countries with missing data)
Constructed from IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) online database (October 
2010 version) 134 2.2513 2.8590 -5.1723 20.2330
Domestic credit growth, 2000-2007 Cumulative growth of domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of 
GDP over 2000-2007
Constructed from World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) online data-
base 134 35.4245 59.0231 -150.7920 184.5996
Trade openness, 2007 Sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP Constructed from World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) online data-
base 136 94.0507 39.2336 25.2111 224.6584
Financial openness, 2007 Sum of total assets (portfolio equity, FDI, debt, FX reserves, derivatives) and 
total liabilities (portfolio equity, FDI, debt, derivatives) as a percentage of GDP
Constructed from External Wealth of Nations (EWN) Mark II database: Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) (online update August 2009) 143 180.4828 217.7390 46.3584 2,335.8710
FDI openness, 2007 Sum of total FDI assets and liabilities as a percentage of GDP Constructed from External Wealth of Nations (EWN) Mark II database: Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) (online update August 2009) 143 51.5745 53.9760 1.3928 452.5033
Portfolio equity openness, 2007 Sum of total portfolio equity assets and liabilities as a percentage of GDP Constructed from External Wealth of Nations (EWN) Mark II database: Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) (online update August 2009) 143 8.3848 19.6508 0.0000 129.9197
Debt openness, 2007 Sum of total debt assets and liabilities as a percentage of GDP Constructed from External Wealth of Nations (EWN) Mark II database: Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) (online update August 2009) 143 95.7561 182.4364 7.4521 2073.7570
Reserves (% of GDP), 2007 Foreign exchange reserves as percentage of GDP Constructed from External Wealth of Nations (EWN) Mark II database: Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) (online update August 2009) 143 24.6639 49.4179 2.6013 582.7254
Reserves (months of import), 2007 Import coverage in months of foreign exchange reserves  World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) online database 119 5.3898 5.1573 0.4121 43.6936
BIS international bank claims (% of GDP), 2007 International consolidated claims by BIS-reporting banks (on immediate bor-
rower basis) as a percentage of GDP Constructed from BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics online database 147 50.5764 279.1818 0.2301 3327.4320
M2 (% of GDP), 2007 Money and quasi-money as a percentage of GDP World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) online database 141 48.2033 32.2028 6.3748 225.4625
Current account balance (% of GDP), 2007 Current account balance as a percentage of GDP IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) online database (October 2010 version) 150 -1.7493 30.8905 -43.1600 329.0340Variable name Definition Source Descriptive statistics
Institutional quality, 2007
Average of five governance indicators that capture perceptions on dimensions 
of political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effective-
ness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption
Constructed from World Bank World Governance Indicators (WGI) database: 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) 149 -0.3586 0.6894 -1.8615 1.1790
Institutional quality (ICRG), 2007 Average of three political risk (sub)components that cover dimensions of law 
and order, corruption and bureaucratic quality Constructed from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database: PRS (2011) 103 2.6650 0.7627 0.6667 4.6667
Stock market capitalisation (% of GDP), 2007 Stock market capitalisation of listed companies as a percentage of GDP World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) online database 70 65.6718 58.9684 0.6638 291.1429
General government balance (% of GDP), 2007 General government net lending/borrowing, calculated as the difference 
between total revenues and total expenditures, as a percentage of GDP IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) online database (October 2010 version) 149 3.6489 28.5152 -15.9030 315.9870
Polity index, 2007
 0-to-1 transformation of the (revised) Polity score, which combines insti-
tutionalised democracy and autocracy scores, and captures how a country 
regime performs on dimensions of competitiveness/openness of executive 
recruitment, regulation/competitiveness of participation and chief executive 
constraints
Constructed from Polity IV database: Marshall et al. (2010) 127 0.6280 0.3160 0 1
Average Polity index, 2000-2006 Average of 0-to-1 transformations of the (revised) Polity scores for 2000-2006 Constructed from Polity IV database: Marshall et al. (2010) 122 0.6019 0.3117 0 1
Institutionalised democracy index, 2007
0-to-1 transformation of the institutionalised democracy score, which cap-
tures how  a country regime performs on dimensions of competitiveness/
openness of executive recruitment, competitiveness of participation and chief 
executive constraints
Constructed from Polity IV database: Marshall et al. (2010) 126 0.4778 0.3690 0 1
Institutionalised autocracy index, 2007
0-to-1 transformation of the institutionalised autocracy score, which captures 
how  a country regime performs on dimensions of competitiveness/openness 
of executive recruitment, competitiveness/regulation of participation and 
chief executive constraints
Constructed from Polity IV database: Marshall et al. (2010) 126 0.2198 0.2920 0 1
Executive constraints, 2007 The extent of institutionalised constraints on the decision-making powers of 
chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities Constructed from Polity IV database: Marshall et al. (2010) 126 4.5952 2.0047 1 7
Voice and accountability, 2007
Governance indicator capturing perceptions of the extent to which a coun-
try's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media
World Bank World Governance Indicators (WGI) database: Kaufmann et al. (2010) 150 -0.3456 0.8453 -2.1859 1.2245
Democracy dummy (DD), 2007
Dummy taking a value 1 if the country regime classifies as democratic based 
on criteria of executive and legislative election, existence and legal status of 
(non-regime) parties
Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) database: Cheibub et al. (2010) 149 0.5101 0.5016 0 1
Checks and balances, 2007
Number of veto players in the political system of a country, adjusting for 
whether these are independent of each other, as determined by the level of 
electoral competitiveness, party affiliation and electoral rules
Database of Political Institutions (DPI): Beck et al. (2001) (online update December 
2010) 136 2.6838 1.8567 1 17
Freedom, 2007 Average of 0-to-1 transformation of political rights and civil liberties scores 
(with reversed scales)
Constructed from Freedom House Freedom in the World online historical database 
(January 2011 version) 149 0.5408 0.2938 0 1
% European language
Fraction of the population speaking one of five major Western European 
languages (English, French, German, Portuguese or Spanish) as a mother 
tongue (in the early 1990s)
Originally from Hall and Jones (1999): retrieved from Dani Rodrik's homepage 143 0.1855 0.3544 0.0000 1.0000
Mean temperature Average annual temperature (in degrees Celsius) (in the early 2000s) Originally from Center for International Development (CID) of Harvard University: 
retrieved from Dani Rodrik's homepage 94 22.5517 5.3035 0.3000 29.3000
Note: Variables in bold are those of the baseline model; see section 4.1.Figure A1: Bivariate scatter plots: Crisis growth and explanatory variables
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Table A3: Pairwise Pearson correlation matrix of explanatory variables
Notes: Pearson correlation coefficients calculated with pairwise deletion of missing data. Number of countries with data available for each pair 
of variables in brackets. * denotes significance at 5%.
Polity GDP pc Av. gr Av. tr gr credit gr tr open fin open M2 CAB inst qual
Polity index, 2007 1.0000    
[N=127]
GDP per capita (log) -0.0142 1.0000    
[N=125] [N=147]
Av. GDP pc growth, 2004-2007 -0.0368 0.1450 1.0000    
[N=123] [N=145] [N=145]
Av. GDP pc trend growth -0.1510 0.2746* 0.6644* 1.0000    
[N=117] [N=134] [N=134] [N=134]
Dom. credit growth, 2000-2007 0.0214 0.0434 0.3696* 0.2523* 1.0000    
[N=116] [N=133] [N=132] [N=124] [N=134]
Trade openness, 2007 -0.0682  0.2650* 0.0954 0.1768* 0.1839* 1.0000    
[N=117] [N=133] [N=132] [N=124] [N=126] [N=136]
Financial openness, 2007 -0.0838  0.2620* -0.0829 -0.0045 -0.0095 0.3960* 1.0000    
[N=126] [N=142] [N=140] [N=132] [N=131] [N=131] [N=143]
M2 (% of GDP), 2007 -0.0652  0.3112* -0.0778 0.0769 -0.1311 0.2421* 0.2188* 1.0000    
[N=119] [N=138] [N=137] [N=126] [N=134] [N=130] [N=134] [N=141]
CAB (% of GDP), 2007 -0.0841 -0.0098 -0.1000 0.0098 -0.1866* -0.1995* 0.1979* -0.1243 1.0000    
[N=127] [N=147] [N=145] [N=134] [N=134] [N=136] [N=143] [N=141] [N=150]
Institutional quality, 2007 0.2561*   0.6699* 0.0525 0.1200 0.0332 0.3031* 0.2479* 0.4191* -0.1500 1.0000
[N=127] [N=147] [N=145] [N=134] [N=134] [N=135] [N=143] [N=140] [N=149] [N=149]42 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
Table A4: Robustness: Change in control variables
Notes: Dependent variable is the 2009-2007 percentage point change in real GDP per capita growth. Column 1 reproduces baseline model (cfr. 
Table 1, column 5). All models are estimated using OLS and include a constant term (coefficient not reported). For definitions of the control 
variables used, see Table A2. Financial openness variable in column 7 does not include foreign reserve assets. Heteroskedasticity-robust (Huber-
White) standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***1%  **5%  *10%.
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
GDP per capita (log), 2007 -1.6705*** -1.9466*** -1.4389*** -1.9589*** -1.9214*** -1.6001*** -1.8912*** -2.4503*** -1.5754***
[0.3998] [0.4124] [0.4605] [0.4205] [0.4007] [0.5059] [0.4394] [0.5674] [0.4110]
Av. GDP pc growth, 2004-2007 -0.6281*** -0.4886** -0.6935*** -0.6881*** -0.6136*** -0.6146*** -0.6257*** -0.7491*** -0.6457***
[0.1913] [0.2369] [0.2001] [0.1772] [0.1667] [0.2026] [0.2117] [0.2346] [0.1849]
Av. GDP pc trend growth -0.3672** -0.6310 -0.3037* -0.2957 -0.3659** -0.4696 -0.2820 -1.0198*** -0.3690**
[0.1704] [0.4274] [0.1774] [0.1824] [0.1661] [0.3591] [0.1841] [0.3294] [0.1749]
Dom. credit growth, 2000-2007 -0.0259** -0.0319*** -0.0244** -0.0281*** -0.0223** -0.0221** -0.0266** -0.0256** -0.0263** -0.0260**
[0.0101] [0.0101] [0.0118] [0.0103] [0.0093] [0.0096] [0.0110] [0.0103] [0.0124] [0.0101]
Trade openness, 2007 -0.0078 -0.0020 -0.0139 0.0022 -0.0328** -0.0188 -0.0205 -0.0190* -0.0184* -0.0052
[0.0107] [0.0115] [0.0117] [0.0149] [0.0135] [0.0116] [0.0125] [0.0103] [0.0108] [0.0112]
Financial openness, 2007 -0.0108*** -0.0106*** -0.0107*** -0.0054 -0.0098*** -0.0110***
[0.0006] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0085] [0.0007] [0.0008]
M2 (% of GDP), 2007 0.0500*** 0.0443*** 0.0473*** 0.0523*** 0.0361*** 0.0539*** 0.0473*** 0.0449*** 0.0617*** 0.0449***
[0.0107] [0.0115] [0.0160] [0.0123] [0.0124] [0.0117] [0.0153] [0.0113] [0.0133] [0.0113]
CAB (% of GDP), 2007 0.0129 -0.0106 0.0036 0.0026 0.1086* 0.0664 0.0438 -0.0101 0.0126 0.0308
[0.0435] [0.0454] [0.0572] [0.0450] [0.0624] [0.0475] [0.0619] [0.0509] [0.0466] [0.0523]
Institutional quality, 2007 -0.4233 -0.9652 -0.3821 0.0943 -0.5461 -0.2110 -0.4461 1.5598 -0.3799
[0.8159] [0.9674] [0.8712] [0.7937] [0.8184] [0.9408] [0.8515] [1.2098] [0.8804]
Polity index, 2007 -4.8527*** -5.0688*** -5.4322*** -4.2680*** -5.0124*** -5.1336*** -6.2805*** -3.6316** -4.4797** -5.1188***
[1.2122] [1.2636] [1.6662] [1.3537] [1.5709] [1.2988] [1.4917] [1.6316] [1.7955] [1.2071]
GDP per capita (log), 2005 -1.2521***
[0.4215]
Av. GDP pc growth, 2002-2005 -0.7440***
[0.2313]
Av. GDP pc trend growth (alt) -0.2258
[0.2275]
Institutional quality (ICRG), 2007 0.7696
[0.9043]
Financial openness (log), 2007 -3.9767*
[2.0026]
NFA (% of GDP), 2007  -0.0276**
[0.0130]
FDI openness, 2007 0.0260**
[0.0117]
Port. equity openness, 2007 0.0060
[0.0151]
Debt openness, 2007 -0.0135***
[0.0012]
Reserves (% of GDP), 2007 -0.0488*
[0.0270]
Reserves (months of import), 2007 -0.2064**
[0.0836]
BIS int bank claims (% of GDP), 2007 -0.0228
[0.0285]
Stock market cap. (% of GDP), 2007 -0.0110*
[0.0059]
Gen. gov. balance (% of GDP), 2007 -0.0647
[0.0581]
Observations 102 102 84 102 102 102 85 102 62 101
R2 0.7157 0.6746 0.7045 0.6638 0.6400 0.7411 0.6923 0.6297 0.8094 0.7179
Adjusted R2 0.6844 0.6389 0.6640 0.6269 0.6005 0.7029 0.6459 0.5890 0.7674 0.6830
p-value (F-test) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000043 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
Table A5: Robustness: Other estimators
Notes: Dependent variable is the 2009-2007 percentage point change in real GDP per capita growth. Baseline model is estimated using OLS 
(cfr. Table 1, column 5). Model in column 2 is estimated using Stata’s robust regression algorithm (rreg command). Models in columns 3-6 
are estimated with instrumental variable estimator (IV-2SLS). All models include a constant term (coefficient not reported). For definitions 
of instruments used, see Table A2. Heteroskedasticity-robust (Huber-White) standard errors in brackets (normal standard errors in column 2). 
Significance levels: ***1%  **5%  *10%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimator Baseline Robust regres-
sion algorithm IV IV IV IV









 % Eur. lan-
guage
GDP per capita (log), 2007 -1.6705*** -1.8819*** -1.6328*** -1.3266*** -1.7096*** -1.7075***
[0.3998] [0.3812] [0.4218] [0.4798] [0.3852] [0.3849]
Av. GDP pc growth, 2004-
2007 -0.6281*** -0.6058*** -0.6980*** -0.9271*** -0.5965*** -0.5980***
[0.1913] [0.1271] [0.2088] [0.1442] [0.1789] [0.1792]
Av. GDP pc trend growth -0.3672** -0.1389 -0.2474 0.4813* -0.4228** -0.4203**
[0.1704] [0.1550] [0.1903] [0.2534] [0.1643] [0.1641]
Dom. credit growth, 2000-
2007 -0.0259** -0.0197*** -0.0238** -0.0132* -0.0261*** -0.0261***
[0.0101] [0.0059] [0.0108] [0.0077] [0.0095] [0.0095]
Trade openness, 2007 -0.0078 -0.0174* -0.0002 -0.0235** -0.0071 -0.0069
[0.0107] [0.0098] [0.0115] [0.0111] [0.0100] [0.0100]
Financial openness, 2007 -0.0108*** -0.0104*** -0.0100*** 0.0026 -0.0110*** -0.0110***
[0.0006] [0.0016] [0.0009] [0.0050] [0.0006] [0.0006]
M2 (% of GDP), 2007 0.0500*** 0.0449*** 0.0517*** 0.0191* 0.0443*** 0.0445***
[0.0107] [0.0112] [0.0115] [0.0106] [0.0158] [0.0158]
CAB (% of GDP), 2007 0.0129 0.0111 0.0693 -0.0385 0.0029 0.0040
[0.0435] [0.0338] [0.0630] [0.0458] [0.0412] [0.0412]
Institutional quality, 2007 -0.4233 0.3780 -1.3614 -0.4101 -0.1807 -0.2051
[0.8159] [0.7383] [1.0013] [0.8986] [0.8541] [0.8523]
Polity index, 2007 -4.8527*** -3.7088*** 0.6449 -3.2286* -5.7000*** -5.5846***
[1.2122] [1.1716] [3.6856] [1.7752] [1.2643] [1.2554]
Observations 102 102 102 76 100 100
R2 0.7157 0.5143 0.6699 0.6437 0.7174 0.7177
Adjusted R2 0.6844 0.4609 0.6336 0.5889 0.6856 0.6859
p-value (F-test) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hansen J statistic N/A N/A N/A 0.523 N/A 3.417
First-stage statistics            
F-test of excluded instru-
ments N/A N/A 24.58 12.45 509.73 353.57
Partial R2 N/A N/A 0.1224 0.2251 0.8278 0.829344 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
Table A6: Robustness: Country subsamples
Notes: Dependent variable is the 2009-2007 percentage point change in real GDP per capita growth. Column 1 reproduces baseline model (cfr. 
Table 1, column 5). All models are estimated using OLS and include a constant term (coefficient not reported). For different country classifica-
tions, see Table A1. Heteroskedasticity-robust (Huber-White) standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***1%  **5%  *10%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)



















GDP per capita (log), 
2007 -1.6705*** -1.5379*** -1.5091*** -1.7482*** -1.7000*** -1.9540*** -1.6831*** -1.5043** -1.0700
[0.3998] [0.5678] [0.3847] [0.4012] [0.4469] [0.6140] [0.4444] [0.6962] [1.6338]
Av. GDP pc growth, 2004-
2007 -0.6281*** -0.8412*** -0.6068*** -0.6178*** -0.6050*** -0.4047 -0.6737*** -0.6055*** -0.7605***
[0.1913] [0.1800] [0.1828] [0.2002] [0.2004] [0.2907] [0.1986] [0.2122] [0.2586]
Av. GDP pc trend growth -0.3672** -0.3680 -0.2966 -0.3705** -0.3990** -0.8486* -0.2999 -0.3779 0.3478
[0.1704] [0.3215] [0.1823] [0.1727] [0.1720] [0.4390] [0.3616] [0.4539] [0.3963]
Dom. credit growth, 
2000-2007 -0.0259** -0.0215* -0.0231** -0.0248** -0.0255** -0.0227* -0.0243** -0.0239 -0.0338**
[0.0101] [0.0126] [0.0099] [0.0103] [0.0103] [0.0127] [0.0109] [0.0144] [0.0136]
Trade openness, 2007 -0.0078 -0.0220* -0.0070 -0.0124 -0.0080 -0.0069 -0.0130 -0.0220 -0.0387
[0.0107] [0.0132] [0.0105] [0.0120] [0.0130] [0.0138] [0.0124] [0.0195] [0.0332]
Financial openness, 2007 -0.0108*** -0.0041 -0.0107*** -0.0072 -0.0090 -0.0110*** -0.0101 0.0047 0.0066
[0.0006] [0.0086] [0.0007] [0.0079] [0.0076] [0.0009] [0.0090] [0.0147] [0.0251]
M2 (% of GDP), 2007 0.0500*** 0.0472*** 0.0447*** 0.0459*** 0.0483*** 0.0541*** 0.0498*** 0.0400* 0.0292
[0.0107] [0.0153] [0.0111] [0.0130] [0.0129] [0.0153] [0.0161] [0.0230] [0.0369]
CAB (% of GDP), 2007 0.0129 0.0562 -0.0156 0.0140 0.0100 0.0053 0.0283 0.0742 0.2316***
[0.0435] [0.0472] [0.0429] [0.0435] [0.0469] [0.0550] [0.0483] [0.0513] [0.0722]
Institutional quality, 
2007 -0.4233 0.3913 0.0259 -0.5096 -0.4744 -0.0336 -0.3645 -0.8357 1.7236
[0.8159] [1.1269] [0.8153] [0.8276] [0.8853] [1.1488] [0.9032] [1.2360] [2.3044]
Polity index, 2007 -4.8527*** -5.6182*** -4.5812*** -5.0814*** -4.7975*** -5.3026*** -5.2116*** -5.4810*** -5.1521*
[1.2122] [1.6740] [1.1806] [1.2397] [1.2569] [1.5445] [1.5397] [1.7514] [2.8950]
Observations 102 82 99 99 96 76 93 68 29
R2 0.7157 0.6960 0.6702 0.6758 0.6717 0.7033 0.6601 0.6114 0.6620
Adjusted R2 0.6844 0.6532 0.6327 0.6390 0.6330 0.6576 0.6186 0.5432 0.4742
p-value (F-test) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.001545 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
Table A7: Robustness: Other crisis growth measures
Notes: Dependent variable in the baseline model is the 2009-2007 percentage point change in real GDP per capita growth (column 1; cfr. Table 
1, column 5). Other dependent variables as stated. All models are estimated using OLS and include a constant term (coefficient not reported). 
Heteroskedasticity-robust (Huber-White) standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***1%  **5%  *10%.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Baseline
2009-2008 ∆ 
in real GDP pc 
growth
GDP pc growth 
in 2009
GDP pc growth 
in 2008
GDP per capita (log), 2007 -1.6705*** -1.4084*** -1.8781*** -0.4697
[0.3998] [0.4137] [0.3928] [0.2877]
Av. GDP pc growth, 2004-
2007 -0.6281*** -0.2469 0.1108 0.3577***
[0.1913] [0.1892] [0.1758] [0.1075]
Av. GDP pc trend growth -0.3672** -0.0658 0.0259 0.0916
[0.1704] [0.1813] [0.2330] [0.1308]
Dom. credit growth, 2000-
2007 -0.0259** -0.0193** -0.0186* 0.0007
[0.0101] [0.0079] [0.0094] [0.0053]
Trade openness, 2007 -0.0078 -0.0092 -0.0117 -0.0025
[0.0107] [0.0102] [0.0107] [0.0078]
Financial openness, 2007 -0.0108*** -0.0104*** -0.0105*** -0.0001
[0.0006] [0.0009] [0.0007] [0.0007]
M2 (% of GDP), 2007 0.0500*** 0.0418*** 0.0593*** 0.0176**
[0.0107] [0.0095] [0.0124] [0.0084]
CAB (% of GDP), 2007 0.0129 0.0183 0.0568 0.0385
[0.0435] [0.0381] [0.0417] [0.0301]
Institutional quality, 2007 -0.4233 -0.2721 -0.3524 -0.0803
[0.8159] [0.8744] [0.8787] [0.6849]
Polity index, 2007 -4.8527*** -4.1222*** -4.2897*** -0.1675
[1.2122] [1.2892] [1.1235] [1.0813]
Observations 102 102 102 102
R2 0.7157 0.5801 0.5754 0.2621
Adjusted R2 0.6844 0.5340 0.5287 0.1810
p-value (F-test) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000046 • IOB working Paper 2012-02  Democracy anD external Shock reSilience in Developing countrieS
Table A8: Robustness: Other democracy measures
Notes: Dependent variable is the 2009-2007 percentage point change in real GDP per capita growth. All models are estimated using OLS and 
include a constant term (coefficient not reported). Column 1 reproduces baseline model (cfr. Table 1, column 5). For definitions of the variables 
used, see Table A2. India is excluded from the model in column 7 (extreme outlier). Heteroskedasticity-robust (Huber-White) standard errors in 
brackets. Significance levels: ***1%  **5%  *10%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP per capita (log), 2007 -1.6705*** -1.5835*** -1.7927*** -1.6499*** -1.8139*** -1.7437*** -1.4201*** -1.8219***
[0.3998] [0.4099] [0.4045] [0.4230] [0.3794] [0.3805] [0.4731] [0.3817]
Av. GDP pc growth, 2004-
2007 -0.6281*** -0.6167*** -0.6488*** -0.6375*** -0.7371*** -0.7122*** -0.6432*** -0.7280***
[0.1913] [0.1988] [0.1882] [0.1984] [0.1935] [0.1810] [0.2131] [0.1917]
Av. GDP pc trend growth -0.3672** -0.3793** -0.3316* -0.3502** -0.2788* -0.2668 -0.4219** -0.2758*
[0.1704] [0.1714] [0.1707] [0.1733] [0.1646] [0.1628] [0.1937] [0.1661]
Dom. credit growth, 
2000-2007 -0.0259** -0.0258** -0.0257** -0.0242** -0.0226** -0.0217** -0.0246** -0.0230**
[0.0101] [0.0101] [0.0101] [0.0102] [0.0097] [0.0094] [0.0102] [0.0097]
Trade openness, 2007 -0.0078 -0.0074 -0.0074 -0.0068 -0.0054 -0.0074 -0.0013 -0.0049
[0.0107] [0.0113] [0.0106] [0.0115] [0.0102] [0.0101] [0.0109] [0.0102]
Financial openness, 2007 -0.0108*** -0.0108*** -0.0107*** -0.0107*** -0.0104*** -0.0105*** -0.0108*** -0.0104***
[0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007]
M2 (% of GDP), 2007 0.0500*** 0.0512*** 0.0487*** 0.0549*** 0.0472*** 0.0441*** 0.0437*** 0.0470***
[0.0107] [0.0109] [0.0103] [0.0108] [0.0112] [0.0110] [0.0112] [0.0113]
CAB (% of GDP), 2007 0.0129 0.0170 0.0160 0.0268 0.0499 0.0511 0.0352 0.0538
[0.0435] [0.0445] [0.0429] [0.0436] [0.0338] [0.0316] [0.0343] [0.0330]
Institutional quality, 2007 -0.4233 -0.2950 -0.6905 -0.4338 0.0990 -0.5139 -1.3187 -0.0606
[0.8159] [0.8591] [0.8632] [0.8779] [0.8869] [0.7739] [0.9130] [0.9104]
Polity index, 2007 -4.8527***
[1.2122]
Inst. democracy index, 
2007 -3.9038***
[1.1202]






Voice and accountability, 
2007 -1.3215**
[0.5766]
Democracy dummy (DD), 
2007 -2.1051***
[0.7552]





Observations 102 101 101 101 115 115 105 115
R2 0.7157 0.7052 0.7140 0.7015 0.6960 0.7036 0.7049 0.6958
Adjusted R2 0.6844 0.6724 0.6822 0.6683 0.6668 0.6751 0.6735 0.6665
p-value (F-test) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 